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FEAR OF DISEASE AND DELAYED
MANIFESTATION INJURIES: A SOLUTION
OR A PANDORA'S BOX?*
TERRY MOREHEAD D WORKIN**
INTRODUCTION
T HE fear of disease, sometimes called hypochondria, has long been
recognized as a medical problem, but seldom as a legal one. Its
costs, therefore, have been borne by its victims and their insurance com-
panies. Although such fears have traditionally been dismissed as ground-
less, I the great strides made recently in the medical profession's ability to
connect environmental exposure with disease are beginning to change
this view. They are also causing a shift in the view of who should bear
the costs of such fears. Increasingly plaintiffs are claiming that the enti-
ties responsible for their exposure to disease-causing agents should com-
pensate them for their concern about the possibility of developing the
disease.2 Courts have so far been unwilling to recognize suits for the
increased chance of developing a delayed-manifestation disease An in-
creasing number, however, are recognizing the right to sue for the fear of
disease development due to that increased chance and for medical moni-
* Common usage ascribes the container of the world's evils given by Zeus to
Pandora to be a box. Apparently, however, Zeus gave them to her in ajar. When Pandora
opened the jar, she unleashed the torments on humanity. See Plummer v. Abbott
Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 n.4 (D.R.I. 1983); R. Warner, Encyclopedia of
World Mythology 29-31 (1975).
** Associate Professor, Business Law, Indiana University; A.B. 1964, Stanford Uni-
versity; J.D. 1974, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. See Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983) (little is known
about the cause, nature or effective treatment of hypocondria, and claims regarding it
must therefore be viewed with healthy skepticism). Disease phobia has been the primary
term used in law suits. See, eg., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 NJ. Super. 561,
568, 461 A.2d 184, 188 (Law Div. 1983); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152
N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958). Anxiety is considered to be a normal
response to threats. Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for Cancerphobia: A Case
for the DES Daughter, 14 Pac. L.J. 1215, 1215 n.1 (1983). Phobia is a recurring sense of
dread without objective danger. IeL
2. See, eg., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1984); Plummer v.
Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 921 (D.R.I. 1983); Mink v. University of Chi-
cago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 546,
437 N.E.2d 171, 174-75 (1982); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 NJ. Super. 561, 565,
461 A.2d 184, 186 (Law Div. 1983); Cummings v. Fondak, 122 Misc. 2d 913, 915, 474
N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d
431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).
3. See, e-g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 536-37 (5th Cir.
1984); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516 (5th Cir. 1984); Plum-
mer v. Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.R.I. 1983); Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 564, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (Law Div. 1983).
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toring necessary to check for that development. The recent expansion of
emotional distress theories and the concomitant easing of restrictions is
likely to facilitate this trend. Compensation for delayed disease-caused
emotional distress may even provide the only recovery possible for
thousands of people who have been exposed to toxic substances but
whose diseases will not become manifest until after statutory limitations
have run.' Such recovery may also provide one way to ease the future
claims problems raised by bankruptcy and reorganization filings,6 and
post-insurance coverage of liabilities.7 Societal costs of open recognition
of such claims, however, are likely to outweigh these benefits. This Arti-
cle discusses the history of disease phobia recovery, the recent expansions
of emotional distress theories, and how they are likely to be combined in
the toxic tort area.
I. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
Common law has long recognized a right to recover for emotional dis-
tress. The tort of assault, which developed as a form of trespass, was
recognized as early as the thirteenth century.' This cause of action was
probably originally created to deal with actions that could lead to a
breach of the peace,9rather than to compensate for the emotional distress
that was caused by the defendant's act. Nevertheless, compensation went
to the victim primarily for the emotional harm suffered.' 0 In the early
courts the amount of that compensation was determined by reference to
a predetermined schedule of payments based on the kind of injury that
was inflicted.'1
4. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 566-67, 461 A.2d
184, 188-90 (Law Div. 1983); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434
(Tenn. 1982); cf. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 521-22 (5th Cir.
1984) (evidence regarding fear of developing cancer admissible if not too prejudicial).
5. See infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text. It would also allow recovery to
those whose diseases never become manifest because they die for some other reason or
they do not develop the diseases.
6. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy. Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1121 n.6, 1122 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Manville
Bankruptcy]; Nat'l L.J., Apr. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1. See infra notes 320-26 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See Hedges, Back-Dated Coverage as Insurance, Chartered Prop. & Casualty Un-
derwriters J., Dec. 1981, at 181-82; Bus. Ins., Mar. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 2. See infra Pt.
IV.B.
8. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 10 (4th ed. 1971). Defamation was
also recognized early in the common law. S. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the
Common Law 332 (1969). It had both civil and criminal overtones for which the victim
could be compensated or the wrongdoer punished. The punishment aspect was to deter
the threat to order inherent in insult or sedition. W. Prosser, supra, § 54, at 333. In these
suits compensation went to the victim only if the suit were in lay juridsiction; the church,
in which defamation could also be heard, could not order compensation in money. S.
Milsom, supra, at 335.
9. W. Prosser, supra note 8, § 10, at 38.
10. Id.
11. C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 21-22 (1935). The fixed pay-
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Compensation for emotional distress was also awarded early in the
common law when that distress arose from an action such as battery or
other nonemotional injury. 12 These damages were parasitic, and could
not be recovered without a finding that the defendant was liable to the
plaintiff for the primary injury to which the emotional claim was
attached. 1
3
The practice of having unscheduled damages determined by the tribu-
nal grew along with the development of the common law of trespass.
t 4
The jury was eventually allowed to set the amount of compensation be-
cause it was familiar with local economic values. 5 Inclusion of damages
for pain and suffering naturally accompanying the plaintiff's injury be-
came part of the jury's assessment of damages.1 6
Unlike property damage or other types of injuries which could be mea-
sured by recognized economic yardsticks, emotional injuries had no ref-
erence to any market value scale. They were highly subjective and
speculative, and as such were not truly compensatory.' 7 As a result they
were viewed with suspicion, and control of such damages became a judi-
cial concern. The judge served as a check on the jury's discretion, with
the power to change awards when he deemed the amount to be out of
line."s Thus judicial concern with control of emotional injury awards has
a long history.
Additional checks helped control tort recovery for emotional suffering.
In assault, for example, the requirement that the threat be imminent lim-
its the number of suits that can be based on apprehension of threatened
harm, and severely limits the time period for which the distress can be
claimed. 9 Even stricter controls were built into the primary emotional
injury torts which developed later.
No cause of action for emotional distress independent of assault or
ments were designed to reduce dispute over the amount to be paid, and thereby, to reduce
blood feuds. Id.
12. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1033, 1049 (1936).
13. C. McCormick, supra note 11, at 1048 & n.64.
14. Id. at 23-25.
15. Id. at 53.
16. See D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 8.1, at 545 (1973).
17. Id.
18. The jury was allowed to assess the value of the damages because it was from the
area and therefore knew the value of the thing damaged. C. McCormick, supra note 11,
at 25. In certain kinds of injuries, however, such as those caused by mayhem or debt, the
judge was equally capable of assessing value because it did not depend on local circum-
stances. Id. Thus the judges in these kinds of cases began to exert their influence regard-
ing what they perceived as uncalled for local largess. Id. This role grew into a general
power to declare awards unsuitable.
19. W. Prosser, supra note 8, § 10, at 39-40. The fact that words alone, no matter how
threatening or frightening, are not grounds for assault also demonstrates the reluctance of
courts to compensate for this tort. See, eg., Hixson v. Slocum, 156 Ky. 487, 488, 161
S.W. 522, 523 (1913); State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 572, 48 S.E. 544, 545 (1904).
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another tort was recognized until this century. 20 Part of the reluctance
to grant such an action was based on the lack of guidelines for the jury to
follow in assessing damages for an injury that had no inherent monetary
value, was not overt, and was subject to great individual variation.2'
Probably the biggest obstacle, however, was the fear of fraudulent claims
and frivolous lawsuits.22 In response to these reservations, the courts
that allowed actions for emotional distress severely restricted the kinds of
actions that could support such claims as well as the persons who could
claim injury.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of
action was contained by requiring proof of extreme and outrageous con-
duct resulting in serious emotional distress, which usually had to mani-
fest itself in a physical illness.23 Mere insults or other annoying behavior
were not to be compensated. 24 The outrageousness could arise from
either the nature of the conduct itself,25 or abuse of a special position or
knowledge.26 If the defendant's action was truly outrageous, the cer-
tainty of resulting emotional distress was assumed to be sufficiently clear
to allow recovery. In addition, such actions were clearly worthy of legal
deterrence. The allowance of such claims also reflected the scientific and
legal communities' growing understanding of emotional injury.
Recognition of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has
occurred more slowly.27 Voicing the same objections about fraudulent
20. See, eg., Spearman v. McCary, 4 Ala. 473, 476, 58 So. 927, 929 (1912) (recovery
allowed when emotional distress causes physical injury); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co.,
162 A.D. 791,792, 148 N.Y.S. 39, 40 (1914) (same).
21. See, e.g., Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R. Co., 18 Ind. 202, 206-07, 47 N.E. 694, 697-
98 (1897); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982).
22. See, eg., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 546, 437 N.E.2d 171, 175
(1982); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 A. 1022, 1022-23
(1905), overruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See generally
Magruder, supra note 12 (reviewing cases on mental disturbance).
23. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965); see, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v.
Counce, 597 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ark. 1980); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244,
253, 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 84 (D.C. 1946); Brooker
v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 533, 534, 99 S.E. 350, 351 (1919).
25. England, in the leading case of Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897), was the
first to recognize that outrageous conduct could lead to recovery for emotional distress.
In Wilkinson, a practical joker told plaintiff that her husband had been smashed up in an
accident and was lying in the street and that she had to go to him at once. Id. at 57; see
Savage v. Bores, 77 Ariz. 355, 358, 272 P.2d 349, 351-52 (1954); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 336, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
26. Recognition of an action for emotional injury first arose in the special circum-
stances of a carrier's duty to its passengers. W. Prosser, supra note 8, § 12, at 52-53; see
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). Businesses with
a special relationship to the public were the first to be held liable. See Richardson v.
Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 132, 217 P.2d 113, 118 (1950) (apartment building
owner); American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 725, 176 S.E. 798, 799-800 (1934)
(money lender).
27. Quite early, a sizeable minority of states allowed recovery for emotional distress
alone against telegraph companies for the mishandling of messages. See, e.g., Western
[Vol. 53
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and frivolous suits and a flood of litigation, the courts have been even
more reluctant to recognize this cause of action.2" Defendant's actions,
being merely unreasonable, are not as good an indicator of the certainty
and severity of resulting distress as are intentional acts. Thus, in order to
maintain control, courts usually refused to grant recovery in negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases unless the plaintiffs could demon-
strate some physical impact from the tort and a physical manifestation of
the emotional distress.29 When third parties were later allowed to sue for
emotional distress resulting from witnessing the defendant injuring an-
other person, the impact and physical manifestation requirements, as
well as the requirement of close familial relationship, served the same
screening purposes.30
A. Recent Developments in Infliction of Emotional Distress
Although some courts still cling to these early restrictions,3 the trend
has been toward liberality in construction, or elimination of these limita-
tions to allow wider recovery in emotional distress cases. In intentional
infliction cases, for example, the class of actions that are considered to be
outrageous has been expanded. As in punitive damages cases, 32 judges
and juries in emotional injury cases now find it relatively easy to be out-
Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 637, 36 So. 517, 520 (1903) (failure to deliver
telegram relating to death of plaintiff's mother); So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55
Tex. 308, 313 (1881) (telegraph company unreasonably late in delivering message of
plaintiff's mother's death and funeral). Many states also allowed recovery for pure emo-
tional distress to individuals whose relatives' bodies had been mishandled. W. Prosser,
supra note 8, § 54, at 329-30; see, e.g., Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226
Ala. 661, 662, 148 So. 154, 155 (1933) (negligent embalming required burial of body
prior to funeral); Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 68, 51 S.E. 24, 28 (1905)
(railroad negligently left body exposed to the elements while shipping); Sworski v.
Simons, 208 Minn. 201, 205, 293 N.W. 309, 311-12 (1940) (coroner and undertaker em-
balmed body without family's permission).
28. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 318, 73 So.
205, 207 (1916); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383, 384, 47 A. 561, 562
(1900).
29. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Steward, 291 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974); Weissman v. Wells,
306 Mo. 82, 90, 267 S.W. 400, 406 (1924).
30. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 550, 437 N.E.2d 171, 177 (1982);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436(3) (1965).
31. See, e.g., Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1982); Indiana Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Hudson, 399 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind. App. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979) (punitive
damages awarded to claimant who accidentally shot himself in leg with defective gun
despite manufacturer's warning and obviousness of the danger, $2,895,000 award re-
manded as excessive); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn.)
($1,000,000 punitive damage award against a manufacturer despite its compliance with
the federal Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1981); Wells v.
Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1982) (jury allowed to award punitive damages even
though it did not return verdict for compensatory damages); cf. Smith v. Wade, 103 S.
Ct. 1625, 1637 (1983) (punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of constitutional rights without showing of actual ill will, spite, or intent to
injure).
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raged by defendant's actions.33
Another trend has been to abandon the requirement of contemporane-
ous physical injury or impact in both intentional and negligent infliction
cases. 34 In these cases, physical manifestation of the emotional distress
has become the primary screening device.35 Some courts have gone even
further by abandoning the physical manifestation requirement and using
the seriousness of the distress as the screen.36 These trends have been
well documented in both cases and law review articles.37 In substituting
these requirements, courts recognize the progress in knowledge about
mental distress and its etiology, diagnosis and proof.38 Even in these
33. See, e.g., Sypert v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1983)
("[p]hysical injury is not a prerequisite ... for recovery of damages for mental anguish if
defendants' actions were 'willful, wanton, and vindictive' "); Morgan v. American Family
Life Assurance Co., 559 F. Supp. 477, 482 (W.D. Va. 1983) (suit allowed for bad faith
refusal to pay insurance benefits); Hubbard v. UPI, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn.
1983) (tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress recognized without need to show
independent underlying tort or physical injury); Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App.
480, 488, 635 P.2d 657, 662 (1981) (privately conducted strip search of checker who was
accused of stealing $20 by customer); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d
275, 289, 669 P.2d 451, 460 (1983) (couple allowed to sue for emotional distress resulting
from police failure to respond to emergency call for 1.5 hours despite assurances that help
was coming).
34. Soon after adoption, courts began to replace the impact rule with a zone of danger
rule, which allowed recovery if plaintiff was within the physical danger area created by
defendant's acts. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wisc. 603, 609, 258 N.W. 497, 501
(1935). This trend has accelerated in the last few years. See, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v.
Counce, 597 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Hubbard v. UPI, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-
39 (Minn. 1983).
35. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982);
Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 448-49, 276 S.E.2d 325, 332-33 (1981). The Dickens
case clarified dicta in Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), which
was intended to bridge the gap between "pure" emotional distress and emotional distress
with physical manifestations by finding that
[t]he nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs, and in some
persons are very delicately adjusted and when "out of tune" cause excruciating
agony. We think the general principles of the law of torts support a right of
action for physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or other-
wise, none the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked
nervous system instead of lacerated limbs.
Id. at 199 n.1, 254 S.E.2d at 623 n.1 (quoting Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 403-
04, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906)). Dickens held that in intentional infliction cases, physical
injury is no longer necessary. 302 N.C. at 448-49, 276 S.E.2d at 332-33.
36. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 77, 451 N.E.2d 759,
765 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547, 437 N.E.2d 171, 175-76
(1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 151, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (1979); Nolan & Ursin, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 Hastings L.J.
583 (1982); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independ-
ent Tort, 59 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1971).
38. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-30, 616 P.2d 813,
820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838-39 (1980); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 448-49,
276 S.E.2d 325, 332-33 (1981).
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later cases, however, control of emotional distress suits continues to be a
concern.
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,39 for example, the California
Supreme Court broke with precedent and found that physical manifesta-
tion of the emotional distress was no longer necessary in a negligent in-
fliction case.' Plaintiff Molien's wife was misdiagnosed by her doctor as
having syphilis, and Molien was emotionally injured by this news and the
resultant marital discord." The court found the touchstone to be the
severity of emotional injury, not physical manifestation, because the state
of the art was such that emotional injury could be established with medi-
cal certainty and causally linked to the shocking experience.42 The re-
quirement that the emotional injury be serious was found to be a
sufficient screen against fraudulent claims, unlimited liability and a flood
of litigation.43 The court found that the former screening device of phys-
ical injury, which had ensured authenticity and seriousness, was both
over- and under-inclusive, and could lead to extravagant pleading and
distorted testimony.' Other courts have followed California's lead in
substituting seriousness for physical manifestation as the screening
device.45
Suits by third parties who witness harm to another and thereby suffer
emotional distress have probably shown the most change and growth in
recent years. The case that firmly established the right of a bystander to
recover for emotional harm resulting from negligent injury to another 6
was the 1968 California case Dillon v. Legg.4 In that case a mother was
allowed to sue for the emotional distress resulting from seeing her child
injured, despite the fact that she was not in the zone of danger and was
not physically injured.4" In order to control subsequent third-party cases,
39. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
40. Id. at 928-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
41. Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
42. Id. at 928-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. The court further
found that emotional injury could be as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and was
equally deserving of redress. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832; accord
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411-13, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974); Hassing v. Wort-
man, 214 Neb. 154, 156, 333 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1983).
43. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
44. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
45. See, eg., Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 564, 632 P.2d
1066, 1070-71 (1981); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106-08 (Iowa 1981); Versland
v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (Mont. 1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 76-
78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1983).
46. New York, in Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 A.D. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914),
allowed third-party recovery, id. at 792, 148 N.Y.S. at 40, but in 1969 the New York
Court of Appeals found that there was no cause of action under such circumstances,
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561
(1969). Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1978 effectively overruled a 1912 deci-
sion that had allowed third-party claims. See Slovensky v. Birmingham News Co., 358
So. 2d 474, 477 (Ala. 1978).
47. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
48. Id. at 742, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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the court stressed that proximity, contemporaneous observance and close
relationship must be shown if the plaintiff is to recover.49 Again, other
states followed California's lead in allowing such suits.50 The three
screening factors, which were meant to be guidelines to foreseeability in
determining who should be allowed to sue,5 became rigid requirements
in an effort to keep such cases under control. 2 Such rigidity led to fine
hairsplitting and denial of recovery in some compelling cases. 53 This in
turn has led to the liberalization of these requirements in some of the
subsequent cases. 54
49. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. These factors were to be used in
assessing the foreseeability that a third party would be injured by defendant's negligence.
50. See Winter, A Tort in Transition: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 70
A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (Mar. 1984); see, e.g., Beanland v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 480 F.2d 109,
113 (8th Cir. 1973); Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 9945, at 25,369 (D.S.D. Oct. 14, 1983); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co.,
31 Conn. Supp. 164, 167, 326 A.2d 129, 131 (Conn. Super. Ct 1973); Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107
(Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982);
Dzikonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 560, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978); Toms v.
McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 651, 207 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1973); Versland v. Caron
Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (Mont. 1983); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 652, 406 A.2d
300, 304 (1979); Porter v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 94, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (1980); Sinn v. Burd,
468 Pa. 146, 151, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (1970); D'Ambra v. United States, 144 R.I. 643, 653,
338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
51. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 37, at 589.
52. Compare Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Cooperman, 158 Cal. App. 3d 844,
850, 204 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1984) (parents of child who was misdiagnosed as having
brain damage were considered to be direct victims of the misdiagnosis because distress
was foreseeable) and Nevels v. Yeager, 152 Cal. App. 3d 162, 169, 199 Cal. Rptr. 300,
305 (1984) (mother who arrived at scene of accident shortly after it occurred allowed
recovery) and Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 97, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980) (allowing recov-
ery to mother who watched futile efforts to save life of seven year old son trapped be-
tween an elevator door and the shaft, but did not see the actual injury occur) with Justus
v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 110-11 (1977) (en
banc) (father who witnessed negligent delivery of stillborn son denied recovery because
shock occurred when father told that fetus dead and not during delivery) and Hathaway
v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1980) (denying
recovery to parents who watched son die by electrocution but who did not see him actu-
ally touch electrified cooler) and Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327,
341-42, 450 N.E.2d 581, 589-90 (1983) (mother denied recovery for emotional distress
resulting from learning that her son was killed in a plane crash, because she had no
sensory perception of the crash).
53. See supra note 52.
54. The Molien case discussed above involves such a liberalization. Molien was al-
lowed to sue despite the fact that he was not at the scene of the misdiagnosis, because the
court found he was a direct victim of the asserted negligence. 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616
P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834; accord Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63
Hawaii 557, 564, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (1981) (emotional distress suit allowed for wrong-
ful death of dog); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.
1982) (liberal adoption in dicta, not on case facts); Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J. Super. 244,
255, 473 A.2d 539, 545 (App. Div. 1984) (neighbor who saw child killed was considered
'surrogate father' and allowed to sue); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837,
844 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (mother who arrived at scene shortly after accident occurred
allowed recovery).
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In Haught v. Maceluch," for example, plaintiff's daughter was injured
during birth by the negligence of the obstetrician. 6 Plaintiff successfully
sued for the mental suffering she incurred because of her daughter's con-
dition, but the award was deleted by the district court because the
mother did not meet one of the the three bystander criteria: She was
under anesthesia during the birth and therefore did not witness the acci-
dent. 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Texas law would allow
recovery.5 8 The court found that the mother was not only at the scene of
the accident, but that in some sense she was the scene; because the acci-
dent happened before parturition, the relationship could not have been
closer. 9 The strength of these two factors was sufficient for recovery
because the court found that Texas law did not require all three Dillon
elements." However, the court went on to find that although plaintiff
did not perceive the injury, she did have an experiential perception6' of
the accident because of the protracted and difficult labor experienced
55. 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 295.
57. Id. The mother sued for her daughter's impaired condition, medical expenses and
future care, loss of the child's future earning capacity, and her mental suffering. She was
awarded $1,160,000 for medical expenses and $175,000 for lost future earnings. The jury
award of $118,000 for mental distress was deleted.
58. Id. at 301-03. Because the Texas Supreme Court had not directly ruled on the
issue, the circuit court found the most relevant case to be Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), which allowed recovery to a girl who witnessed futile efforts
to resuscitate her drowned sister even though it was not clear she had seen the accident.
See id. at 489.
59. Haught, 681 F.2d at 299.
60. Id. at 300. The court relied heavily on a 1967 Texas Supreme Court case that
denied recovery to a man who suffered a conversion reaction neurosis because of his fear
for the safety of a person who had driven her car into his truck. Id. In that case the court
said: "[W]e would be reluctant to hold at this time that any one of the enumerated
factors would of and by itself be sufficient to require a judgment denying liability....
[Instead, we should deal with] cases of this type on a case by case basis." Kaufman v.
Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164, 171 (Tex. 1967). Because all three were not required, the two
strongly met factors were sufficient to establish foreseeability for the Haught court.
In Garland v. Herrin, 554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983),
strength in two categories also convinced the district court to allow suit to the parents of
a girl who was bludgeoned to death by her boyfriend in the parents' home. Suit was
allowed despite the fact that there was no contemporaneous observance because they
were asleep in the next room. See id. at 314. The invasion of the privacy of their home at
night by the boyfriend, who took advantage of their sleep to carry out his murder just a
few feet from where they were, when combined with the "incredible savagery" of the act,
convinced the court to allow suit. See id. at 314. The boyfriend was not to be permitted
to take advantage of his stealth to avoid suit. The Second Circuit reversed, however,
finding that New York does not allow recovery for either reckless infliction of emotional
distress or emotional distress to bystanders. See 724 F.2d at 19. Subsequent to the Second
Circuit opinion the New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery to bystanders who
were within the zone of danger. See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 231-32, 461
N.E.2d 843, 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1984). See supra note 46.
61. The court found the crucial question to be whether she had experiential percep-
tion of the accident, as opposed to seeing the injury or learning of the accident after it
happened. Haught, 681 F.2d at 300.
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before she was anesthetized.62
Many courts that have followed the Dillon precedent have adopted an
additional screening device. These courts, like the Molien court, require
the mental distress to be serious. 63 Serious mental distress is that which
"a reasonable [person] normally constituted, would be unable to ade-
quately cope with" in light of the circumstances of the event. 64 Thus, a
standard reminiscent of the outrageousness requirement in intentional in-
fliction cases is used to keep control over negligent emotional distress
suits. 65 The especially sensitive person is still not to be accorded recovery
for his or her pure mental distress. 6
B. Recent Developments in Other Distress Claims
The broader acceptance of emotional distress as a legitimate injury,
and the willingness of courts to accept proof of it unrelated to physical
injury or impact, is demonstrated by the awards for parasitic emotional
distress which are being made in a wide variety of cases in which they
were previously denied or only infrequently given. In Simon v. Solo-
mon,67 for example, a tenant was awarded $35,000 for the emotional
distress of having her apartment flooded with sewage thirty times.68 This
case marked the first time that a state supreme court upheld emotional
distress damages against a landlord.69 Emotional damages were also
62. Plaintiff was in labor for eleven hours. During that time she knew that something
was wrong, that the doctor had been called several times but failed to appear, and that
the doctor had "over-administer[ed] a powerful drug which caused distress to herself and
to her child." Id. at 301.
The Haught case is in sharp contrast to a California case that denied recovery under
similar circumstances. In Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1977), a father who witnessed the negligent delivery of his stillborn son was
denied suit because his anxiety during the delivery did not become a disabling shock until
he was told by the doctor that the fetus was dead. Id. at 582, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 111. Because he did not know the exact injury, he lacked the appropriate con-
temporaneous observance. Id., 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
The Haught court was careful to point out that plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the
actual existence or extent of her child's injuries was not conclusive. It found that foresee-
ability of emotional distress did not turn on such a single fact, which is often absent even
in the typical 'uninjured bystander' case. 681 F.2d at 301.
63. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 406, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (1974);
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982); Payton v. Ab-
bott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547, 437 N.E.2d 171, 175-76 (1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
151, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (1979).
64. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970).
65. Outrageousness set a standard against which the reasonableness as well as the
authenticity of plaintiffis emotional distress could be judged. A reasonable person stan-
dard in negligence cases does the same thing.
66. See Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. 365, 369, 446 N.E.2d 78, 81 (1983) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who suffered emotional distress leading to her death because she
mistakenly believed her child was an accident victim).
67. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982).
68. Id. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 561.
69. See infra note 114 for a discussion of emotional distress in nuisance cases.
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awarded for the first time in a first amendent case70 in Abramson v. An-
derson.71 Abramson, a high school teacher, was awarded $300 for the
mental distress he suffered from being exposed to prayers in two school
holiday assemblies.72
Another area in which emotional distress claims have recently been
recognized is in suits for the "wrongful birth" of a child. An increasing
number of courts are allowing parents to recover against physicians for
the mental anguish of having a healthy but unwanted child because ster-
ilization procedures were negligently performed,73 or for the anguish of
having a defective child because genetic counseling was faulty or ab-
sent.74 Although courts usually do not allow the child to recover for its
own wrongful life75 because of the difficulties in determining the value of
being born with handicaps versus not being born at all,76 they are no
longer deterred from allowing parental recovery for the intangible emo-
tional distress.77
Courts are also increasingly interpreting statutes to encompass dam-
ages for emotional distress. The Fifth Circuit incorporated emotional
damages into the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act in a case in which
a sixty year old woman was traumatized by a burglar when her home
security system failed.7" The woman recovered for her past and future
mental anguish which resulted from the defendant home security com-
pany's misleading representations about its system.79 The Deceptive
Trade Practices Act under which she sued provided for recovery of ac-
70. Natl. L.J., Feb. 8, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
71. See id. (discussing Abramson v. Anderson, No. 81-27W (D. Iowa 1982)).
72. The award was only for S300 because the prayers, led by the school's principal at
Easter and Christmas assemblies, were of short duration, and Mr. Abramson's distress
was assumed to be similarly short-lived. Id.
73. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d
1294, 1296 (Ariz. 1983); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 3, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1981);
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 80, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (1981).
74. See, e.g., Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., 9 Faro. L
Rep. (BNA) 2470, 2470 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1982); Berman v. Allan, 80 NJ. 421,
425, 404 A.2d 208, 212 (1979).
75. A few courts have allowed such suits. See, eg., Tirpin v Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220,
226, 643 P.2d 954, 958, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1982); Harberson v. Parke Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 466, 656 P.2d 438, 442 (1983).
76. Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., 9 Fam. L Rep.
(BNA) 2470, 2470 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1982).
77. Many other examples of such expansion to encompass emotional distress claims
exist. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (D.NJ. 1983) (family
allowed to continue libel suit of deceased because they had suffered untold humiliation,
anguish and mental suffering); Nogueira v. Nogueira, 388 Mass. 79, 84,444 N.E.2d 940,
943 (1983) (husband allowed to sue wife for intentional infliction of emotional distress for
acts committed four days after divorce granted); cf. Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.
App. 3d 58, 64, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1983) (unmarried woman who lived with man as
his wife for 12 years allowed to sue for loss of consortium).
78. See Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1983).
79: See id. at 204. The elderly widow suffered a post-trauma stress syndrome as a
result of the burglary. Id. at 200.
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tual damages;"0 the court interpreted this to mean common law dam-
ages.81 Because the woman's emotional injury had manifested itself in
physical symptoms, 2 she met the Texas common law requirement for a
mental anguish award and therefore could recover under the statute.83
In Young v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association 4
the California Court of Appeal allowed a consumer to recover treble
damages under the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act 5 for the emotional
distress she suffered after the bank refused to remove charges from her
account.8 6 Plaintiff had loaned her BankAmericard Visa to a friend so
that he could buy a one-way ticket to Hawaii.87 He did not return the
card, and two days after lending it she reported it stolen.8  When the
bank recovered the card four months later, there were $2,200 in charges,
which the bank continued to charge to plaintiff.89 Despite the fact that
the charges were disputed, the bank informed a credit reporting service
that plaintiff's account was over its limit and past due.9" She was subse-
quently denied credit.91 The court found that plaintiff's feelings of dis-
tress and frustration over several months justified the jury's award of
$50,00092 against the bank's "computer-hearted insensitivity."93 Again,
these cases present just a few examples of the emotional recovery expan-
sion in the statutory area.94 That expansion has even longer roots in the
80. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.5 (Vernon 1968).
81. Pope, 703 F.2d at 202.
82. Id. at 200. Plaintiff's anxiety caused severe weakness in her legs, bordering on
paralysis, which required hospitalization. Id.
83. Id. at 204.
84. 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1983).
85. The Act, which is designed to impose fair business standards for the protection of
consumers, limits a cardholder's liability to $50.00 after it is reported stolen. Cal. Civ.
Code § 1747.20 (West 1973) (repealed 1982).
86. Young, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
87. Id. at 112, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124. The court found that the friend's taking of the
card was under false pretenses because he never intended to return it, and that therefore it
was stolen for purposes of the Act. Id. at 114, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
88. Id., 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Plaintiff had loaned it to him on the condition that le
only buy the ticket, that he call her every day and that he return the card when he
returned. When he failed to call the next two days, she reported the card stolen. Id., 190
Cal. Rptr. at 124.
89. Id. at 113, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
90. Id., 190 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
91. Id., 190 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
92. Id. at 116, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The $50,000 award was automatically trebled
under the Act. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1747.50, 1747.70 (West Supp. 1985).
93. 141 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
94. In Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983), an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) revenue officer suffered emotional distress and accompanying
physical injury when the Internal Security Division of the IRS investigated him for 2.5
years before interviewing him. Id. at 973. This was found to be a deliberate violation of
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (1982), which requires to the greatest extent prac-
ticable that information be collected directly from the target of the investigation. The
Privacy Act provides for "actual damages" for an agency's intentional or wilful failure to
comply with its provisions. The Fifth Circuit found that 'actual damages' includes dam-
ages for mental distress. 700 F.2d at 986; see Note, Damages Under The Privacy Act of
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liberal interpretations of the state workers' compensation statutes.95
Last term, however, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow
emotional impact to play a determinative role in interpreting an environ-
mental impact statute.96 The decision reversed the ruling of the District
of Columbia Circuit Court, which had held that under the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to con-
sider the environmental impact of major federal actions that have a
significant effect on the human environment, the agency must consider
the degree to which the proposed action affects public health and
safety.97 Plaintiffs9" alleged that the start-up of the Three Mile Island
reactor would create the risk of an accident, which caused them to fear
that risk. 9 The circuit court found that the psychological effect of this
fear, or the impact on the psychological health of nearby residents, was
part of the public's health and safety, and had to be considered by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission before deciding whether to permit re-
sumption of operation of the nuclear power plant."o Although mere dis-
satisfaction engendered by political disagreements or economic or social
concerns were not to be considered, the inquiry was to include genuine
post-traumatic fears that engendered fears of recurring catastrophe and
1975: Compensation and Deterrence, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 611, 630 (1984); see also Je-
anty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (5th Cir. 1974) (Fair Housing Act's
provision for actual damages includes damages for emotional distress and humiliation);
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983) (parents allowed to sue for mental
anguish and loss of society under Texas wrongful death statute); cf. Nearing v. Weaver,
295 Or. 702, 706, 670 P.2d 137, 140 (1983) (wife allowed to sue police officers who know-
ingly failed to enforce court order issued under Abuse Prevention Act).
95. See, eg., Martinez v. University of California, 93 N.M. 455, 459, 601 P.2d 425,
428 (1979) (recovery allowed for phobia that continued exposure to radioactive material
would result in death); Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 508, 160 N.E.2d 901,
904 (1959) (recovery for excessive job-related mental strain); Hall v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726, 730 (V. Va. 1983) (despite specific language in
statute forbidding recovery for self-inflicted injury, widow permitted to bring workers'
compensation claim if she could show that husband's suicide arose because he sustained
an injury in the course of employment which resulted in serious mental disorder and that
he would not have committed suicide without the disorder).
96. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
779 0983).
97. 678 F.2d 222, 235 (1982).
98. Plaintiff, People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), was composed primarily of
neighbors of the Three Mile Island power plant. 460 U.S. at 774.
99. Id. at 769. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had decided to allow
reactor number 1, which was not damaged in the Three Mile Island accident on March
28, 1979, to reopen. Id. It had been in cold shutdown since the accident. Metropolitan
Edison Company, a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation, the owners,
sought start-up permission from the NRC. In arriving at its start-up decision, the NRC
had consistently refused to consider neighboring residents' claims that psychological dis-
tress would accompany start-up. Id.
100. "The government must not proceed to make decisions that might have a momen-
tous effect on the psychological health and community well-being of its citizens without
first giving careful, responsible consideration to the consequences its actions might have."
678 F.2d at 235.
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that were accompanied by physical effects.101
The Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion, held that the Commis-
sion was only required to assess the impact on the physical environ-
ment.1 °2 Although recognizing that psychological health could be
considered under NEPA, it found that such consideration was not war-
ranted in this case because there was too tenuous a connection between
the change in the environment and the alleged psychological harm. 103 In
rejecting the emotional impact claim, the Court cited reasons reminiscent
of earlier courts' objections to emotional distress claims: the fear of
fraudulent or frivolous claims and the potential impact on decisionmak-
ing resources if such considerations were allowed." The Court warned
that if the circuit court's ruling were upheld, agencies could be forced "to
expend considerable resources developing psychiatric expertise"105 and
that their resources may be spread so thin the agency could not do its
job. 106 In addition, it would be difficult for the agency to differentiate
between genuine psychological claims and other objections based on
political differences.10 7 Thus, with somewhat tortured logic the Court
found that although NEPA "was enacted to require agencies to assess
the future effects of future actions,"10 the effects of the risk of accident
could only be considered in regard to the physical environment. 0 9
The Court recognized that a risk, which "is a pervasive element of
101. In allowing consideration of emotional impact, the court echoed the containment
concerns of other courts dealing with emotional distress suits, and limited consideration
to genuine (reasonable, serious) fears that manifested themselves by physical effects. See
id. at 234. In addition, the court pointed out that reactor number 2 (TMI-2) was a
unique case because considerable stress had already been created by the accident at that
reactor. Therefore the considerations used for TMI-2 would not necessarily be applicable
to other nuclear regulatory decisions. Id. at 229-30.
102. 460 U.S. at 774.
103. Id. The Court concluded that two factors lay between the change in the environ-
ment (the start-up of the reactor) and the emotional distress: the risk of an accident that
would not affect the physical environment, and perception of the risk by PANE members.
These two factors made the connection too tenous to be considered. Id. at 775.
104. 460 U.S. at 776. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
105. 460 U.S. at 776.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 460 U.S. at 779. The business community supported the NRC and Metropolitan
Edison in its appeal. Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1983, at 4, col. 2. The United States Chamber
of Commerce's National Litigation Center said that requiring psychological studies
would provide a very effective means for delaying federal action. 1d. This view was also
expressed by the National Association of Manufacturers. Id.
The Court also ruled against political objections to nuclear use in Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). It upheld the
NRC decision that licensing boards, when considering the environmental impact of a
nuclear plant under § 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(c) (1982), should assume that permanent storage of nuclear waste would have
no significant impact on the environment. See 103 S. Ct. at 2251, 2258. The decision
means that the environmental effects of nuclear waste do not have to be considered each
time a new plant is given clearance.
109. 460 U.S. at 778.
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modem life" '  often created by modem technology, can generate stress
which in turn can cause serious health damage.' Although stating that
the balance to be struck between the risks of technology and its gain is an
important policy issue, it was not one the Court chose to tackle in this
politically charged context. 2 Allowing anxiety about future risks in the
context of agency decisionmaking apparently was viewed by the Court as
opening a Pandora's box of emotional impact claims." 3
In refusing to recognize fear of future risks in the environmental con-
text, the Court overlooked a long line of precedent that allowed fear of
risks to be considered in civil damage suits.' 4 The result, however, does
coincide with several recent decisions by lower courts in fear of disease
cases. Unlike emotional distress damages in general, recovery for distress
caused by the fear of disease has been approached with extreme caution
in recent toxic tort cases.
110. Id. at 775.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 776.
113. The Court specifically referred to the relatives of people living near Three Mile
Island, whose fears may cause them to suffer psychological health problems with physical
manifestations if the reactor were put into operation. Although these fears would be
caused by a change in the environment, they would be too attenuated to merit recovery.
Id. at 774.
The Court also recognized that psychological health damage to residents could actu-
ally occur. "Nonetheless, it is difficult for us to see the differences between someone who
dislikes a government decision so much that he suffers anxiety and stress, someone who
fears the effects of that decision so much that he suffers similar anxiety and stress, and
someone who suffers anxiety and stress that 'flow directly' .. from the risks associated
with the same decision." Id. at 777-78.
114. Fear of consequences in an environmentally related context has long been recog-
nized in the law of nuisance. Because nuisance involves interference in the use and enjoy-
ment of land, emotional damages are easily included within this tort. See W. Prosser,
supra note 8, § 87, at 574. For example, fear of the spread of disease, if it is common
within the community, is cognizable even though the fear is without scientific foundation.
Id. at 579. Emotional damages, which have generally been tied to a physical invasion of
the property, see Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 55 (1979); see, e.g., Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 48 F.
Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Va. 1979) (emotional distress caused by sickness of plaintiff's for-
mer employees due to toxic fumes and dust from kepone); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 844, 847, 574 P.2d 766, 768, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 697 (1978) (emotional distress caused
by noise, vibrations, air pollution and smoke from new runway), are increasingly being
sought for environmental pollution, see Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 704, 613
P.2d 63, 66 (1980) (landowners allowed to sue for fear they would develop health
problems from breathing dust-laden air).
For a different line of cases see, for example, Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 920
(D. Pa. 1951) (fear of breast cancer from blow to chest); Serio v. American Brewing Co.,
141 La. 290, 292, 74 So. 998, 999 (1917) (fear of rabies from dogbite); Garner v.
Winchester, 110 S.W.2d 1190, 1193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (fear of lockjaw and blood
poisoning from dogbite).
The Court also ignored the precedent of Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), which held that an expectation of an increase in
crime in the area resulting from the construction of a jail was part of the urban environ-
ment impact which had to be considered.
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IL DAMAGES FOR FEAR OF DISEASE
Fear of disease that arises from an injury caused by defendant's wrong-
ful act was traditionally considered to be part of or akin to pain and
suffering damages commonly awarded. By the 1920's several states had
recognized parasitic damages for fear of disease or injury arising from,
but different than, the original bodily injury. 115 The overwhelming ma-
jority of these early cases involved fears that were necessarily short-lived.
The most prevalent claim, for example, involved fear of hydrophobia or
rabies from dog bites." 6 Because the period during which rabies can
develop after being bitten is no longer than a year, plaintiff's fears about
its development could not realistically last longer than this period.," As
in other emotional distress cases, courts denied recovery to plaintiffs
whose fears of future disease were not grounded on sound probability;
therefore, fears lasting longer than the incubation period were not
compensated." 8
Other common claims were for fear of lockjaw, blood poisoning and
miscarriage." 9 Realistic fears of these diseases would also be of limited
duration.' 20 Although some of the later cases were based on fears of
115. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.R., 54 Cal. App. 744, 749, 202 P. 919, 922-23 (1921);
Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 123, 52 S.E. 152, 153 (1905); Sero v.
American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 294, 74 So. 998, 1001 (1917); Buck v. Brady, 110
Md. 568, 569, 73 A. 277, 279 (1909); Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168,
173, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084 (1903); Walker v. Boston & Me. R.R., 71 N.H. 251, 252, 51 A.
918, 919 (1902); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 331, 74 S.E. 885,
886 (1912); Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C.C. 630, 632 (1898); Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29
Okla. 399, 404-05, 117 P. 1088, 1090 (1911); Southern Kan. Ry. v. McSwain, 55 Tex.
Civ. App. 317, 318, 118 S.W. 874, 875 (1909); Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251, 254-55
(1880); Elliott v. Arrowsmith, 149 Wash. 631, 633, 272 P. 32, 32-33 (1928).
116. See, e.g., Friedman v. McGowan, 17 Del. 436,437,42 A. 723, 724 (1898); Serio v.
American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 294, 74 So. 998, 1001 (1917); Buck v. Brady, 110
Md. 568, 569, 73 A. 277, 279 (1909); Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C.C. 630, 632 (1898);
Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251, 252 (1880).
117. Although the incubation period for rabies ranges from ten days to more than a
year, the average is 30 to 50 days. Several bites, or a bite near the head, accelerate the
time. Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 69 (D. Hovey 12th ed. 1972); see Serio v.
American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 294, 74 So. 998, 1001 (1917) (fear of hydrophobia
reasonable until 100 days after the dogbite).
118. See, e.g., Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 122, 52 S.E. 152, 153
(1905) (After glass is removed from plaintiff's stomach, and he is "restored to his former
condition of health and vigor, his fears, so far as a damage suit are concerned, should
cease."); Elliott v. Arrowsmith, 149 Wash. 631, 633, 272 P. 32, 32-33 (1928) (recovery
appropriate for mental anguish caused by reasonable dread of future illness or death as a
result of injury, but not for such dread as may be vague or fanciful or that may continue
after the conditions that might result in such future illness or death have been removed);
cf. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 7i 1, 724-25, 98 S.W.2d 969, 977 (1936) (fear
of paralysis or epilepsy developing from head injury caused by defendant not compensa-
ble because no evidence that those conditions are likely to develop).
119. See, e.g., Butts v. Nat'l Exch. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168, 173, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084
(1903); Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C.C. 630, 632 (1898); Southern Kan. Ry. v. Mc-
Swain, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 317, 318, 118 S.W. 874, 875 (1909).
120. See Garner v. Winchester, 110 S.W.2d 1190, 1193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (fear of
rabies, lockjaw and blood poisoning from dogbite).
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different diseases or injuries, most of them also contained inherent time
limitations.12 The courts were not particularly concerned with control
of this form of emotional damage. The fear arose from physical injury,
which was easily verified and, the plaintiff was not compensated for it
unless the fear was deemed to be founded on sound probability and of
limited duration. Thus, worry about fraudulent and spurious claims and
a flood of litigation was not an important issue.
This is in sharp contrast to the law regarding claims for emotional
distress unaccompanied by serious physical injury, which was developing
at the same time. As discussed previously,"z concern about fraudulent
and frivolous suits was pre-eminent, and recovery could be had only in
the most egregious or clear cut cases.
Although a few early decisions recognized the right to recover for fear
of an injury that did not contain inherent time limitations,123 it was not
until the middle of this century that suits for fear of diseases such as
cancer, which have no specific development or termination date, became
more commonplace. 2 4 One of the earliest cases to allow recovery for a
fear of an "unlimited" disease was the 1912 case of Alley v. Charlotte Pipe
& Foundry Co. 125 Plaintiff Alley was seriously burned when a negligently
made core exploded.' 26 A physician was allowed to testify that the re-
sulting wound was "liable" to lead to an "eating cancer" or sarcoma.' 2 '
The court equated "liable" with "probable," and held that the testimony
was adequate to corroborate plaintiff's mental suffering. 2 8 It found that
the probability of cancer "must necessarily have a most depressing ef-
121. A fear of paralysis, for example, would presumably abate with time as the plaintiff
realized that it was not happening or regained use of the injured area. See Smith v.
Boston & Me. RtR., 87 N.H. 246, 259, 177 A. 729, 738-39 (1935); Dulaney Inv. Co. v.
Wood, 142 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); cf. Halloran v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 95 Vt. 273, 274, 115 A. 143, 144 (1921) (plaintiff allowed to recover for distress
caused by knowledge that accident had damaged her heart, thereby preventing her from
having operation for a pre-existing malignancy). But cf. Walker v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
71 N.H. 251, 252, 51 A. 918, 919 (1902) (plaintiff recovered for apprehension that she
would become insane).
122. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Walker v. Boston & Me. R.tL, 71 N.H. 251, 252, 51 A. 918, 919 (1902)
(fear of insanity); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 479, 161 N.E. 557,
560 (1928) (fear of consequences of needle in body); cf. Gray v. Washington Water
Power Co., 30 Wash. 665, 673-75, 71 P. 206, 209 (1903) (anxiety about pity and abhor-
rence others likely to feel towards plaintiff because of disfigurement).
124. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 920-21 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (fear of
breast cancer); Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 585, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (1947) (fear of
epilepsy); Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 646-47, 13 A.2d 677, 678-79 (1940) (plaintiff
feared cancer might recur when hit in area where breast had been removed); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-53, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (1958)
(cancerphobia); Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980, 982-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (fear of
breast cancer).
125. 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912).
126. Id. at 329, 74 S.E. at 885-86.
127. Id. at 330, 74 S.E. at 886.
128. Id. at 330-31, 74 S.E. at 886.
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fect" because, "[1]ike the sword of Damocles, [plaintiff] knows not when
it will fall."' 29 The practice of having a physician's testimony corrobo-
rate the possibility of development of the feared disease to prove the rea-
sonableness of the fear was followed in later cases.' 30 Fear of unlikely
developments, especially in this kind of case, was not compensated.' 3'
Although the Alley court expressed some sympathy for Alley's appre-
hensions, thirty years elapsed before appellate courts again dealt with a
similar issue.132 The 1958 case of Ferrara v. Galluchio,13 a which is often
cited as a landmark decision,'13  also involved a wound that a doctor
advised might become cancerous.135 In this suit against her physician for
x-ray bums, plaintiff was allowed to testify that her dermatologist had
advised her to get six-month check-ups for cancer. 136 This advice caused
plaintiff to develop a neurosis about cancer. 137 The testimony regarding
the dermatologist's advice legitimized plaintiff's fears as realistic, and she
recovered for them.13  This case, as well as other similar cases decided
around this time, have in common with the earlier fear of disease cases
the fact that the feared disease would arise from an existing injury in-
flicted by defendant. 39 No recovery was granted for fear of disease unac-
companied by pre-existing injury."
Fear of disease cases since Ferrara have also allowed recovery so long
as there was a pre-existing injury. '4' The existing injury, rather than the
degree of probability that the disease may actually develop, is determina-
tive. Thus, in Heider v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 142 the
plaintiff, who received a cerebral concussion in a car accident, recovered
for his fear of developing epilepsy even though there was only a two to
five percent chance of its developing. 43  The plaintiff in Lorenc v.
129. Id. at 331, 74 S.E. at 886.
130. See infra notes 160-68.
131. See infra note 148.
132. See supra note 124.
133. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
134. See 69 A.B.A. J. 725, 726 (1983).
135. Ferrara, 5 N.Y.2d at 19, 152 N.E.2d at 251, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
136. Id., 152 N.E.2d at 251-52, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
137. Id., 152 N.E.2d at 251, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
138. Id. at 21-22, 152 N.E.2d at 252-53, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000. The decision has
been criticized because it established precedent for suits against physicians by patients
whose fears were caused by complete disclosure of possible effects. See McCoid, The
Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 590-91 (1959). Such suits,
however, have failed to materialize. In fact, just the opposite has occurred. Doctors are
increasingly being sued for failing to give patients sufficient information. See, e.g., Shetter
v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 373, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607,
411 P.2d 45 (1966); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 599-604, 207 N.W.2d 297,
313-15 (1973).
139. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 148.
141. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
142. 231 So. 2d 438 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
143. Id. at 441-42.
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Chemirad Corp.144 recovered for his fear of developing cancer from a
chemical burn on his hand despite the fact that cancer was highly un-
likely and preventable. 4 The plaintiff, a doctor, refused a skin graft that
would have cured the hand ulceration from which he feared cancer
would arise. 4 In addition, the plaintiff had had only a single exposure to
the chemical; repeated exposure was necessary to cause cancer in rats.1 47
As long as there is some reasonable medical basis for the fears, and a pre-
existing injury, recovery is allowed. 148 In recent toxic tort cases, in
which the typical pre-existing injury is arguably absent, courts have been
reluctant to allow recovery despite the clear medical probability that the
disease could develop. 49
III. FEAR OF DISEASE FROM Toxic SUBSTANCES
The recent product liability suits based on fear of disease differ from
the earlier cases in several ways. One of the most important differences is
that there is generally no diagnosable pre-existing injury from which the
feared disease will come. The lack of such injury distinguishes these cases
in two regards: Damages for the fears are not parasitic, and proof of
injury is likely to be considered more speculative. Because of these differ-
ences courts are looking to traditional emotional distress limitations to
determine the viability of claims and proceeding very cautiously. Toxic
tort claimants, however, should be able to recover even under the more
restrictive emotional distress requirements.
A. Negligent Infliction in Toxic Tort Cases
The original screening device in negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress was the requirement that plaintiff suffer some contemporaneous
physical injury or impact.'5 As was discussed above, physical manifes-
144. 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962).
145. Id. at 74, 80-81, 179 A.2d at 410, 414.
146. Id. at 79, 179 A.2d at 413.
147. Id., 179 A.2d at 413. The court stated:
Although Dr. Lorenc's testimony as to the reasons for his failure to accept a
skin graft is not very impressive, and although his reasons reflect adversely
upon his assertion of fear of malignancy, and even upon the present need for
such surgery, .. the circumstances in their totality warranted submi[ssion] to
the jury.
IM. at 79, 179 A.2d at 413.
148. See, e.g., Birkhill v. Todd, 20 Mich. App. 356, 366-67, 174 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1969)
(no recovery for anxiety about a fictitious, vague, fanciful or imagined consequence); Bay-
lor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 825-26, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (1964) (reasonable certainty
that anxiety resulted from injury required); cf. Howard v. ML Sinai Hosp., Inc., 63 Wisc.
2d 515, 519, 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (1974) (Catheter broke in plaintiff's shoulder leaving
two pieces that could not be found. Although it was uncontested that he genuinely feared
cancer, the possibility of it developing was so remote, and so out of proportion to the
culpability that recovery was denied on public policy grounds.).
149. See infra notes 169-78, 197-201.
150. See, eg., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 548, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176
(1982); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
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tation of the emotional distress was substituted for the impact rule when
that rule was perceived to be too limiting. 151 Some courts have further
liberalized recovery by requring only that the emotional distress be seri-
ous. 152 Ironically, toxic tort plaintiffs, who can meet the physical injury/
impact requirement, are generally barred because they do not meet the
more liberal screening devices.
1. Impact in Toxic Tort Cases
Toxic tort plaintiffs have a fear of disease because they have in some
manner come in physical contact with a harmful substance. 153 Plaintiffs
come in contact with that harmful substance due to defendant's alleged
negligence, and that impact leads to their emotional distress. It is foresee-
able that negligently causing someone to come into contact with a harm-
ful substance, which can cause serious or deadly disease, could lead to
emotional distress. Thus toxic tort claimants should be able to recover
under the traditional impact rule. 1 54
Long before the physical manifestation rule became common, impact
had become quite easy to show as courts 155 joined legal commentators 1 6
in the view that this screening device was not crucial. Thus a man who
inhaled oily and smoky dust showed sufficient impact without any physi-
cal damage to bring suit for his mental anxiety, 157 and a plaintiff who felt
a shock wave from an explosion but was not injured by it likewise
showed sufficient impact. 158 The ingestion of a harmful substance is cer-
tainly sufficient impact under this more relaxed standard.
Adulterated food cases provide a close analogy. Plaintiffs who ingest a
noxious substance in adulterated food but who suffer no physical injury
find no barriers to bringing suit for emotional distress. 159 A few courts
151. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
153. Generally, plaintiffs have ingested a harmful substance in their drinking water,
see, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 564-65, 461 A.2d 184, 186
(Law Div. 1983); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982),
or in drugs, see, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. I11.
1978); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 544, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1982), or they
have inhaled it. See infra notes 264-65.
154. See Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978) (impact of tubercle
bacilli entering body sufficient to sustain claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress under Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982)).
155. See, e.g., Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 116, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (1930) (per
curiam); Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955),
overruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
156. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 8, §54, at 330-32; Goodrich, Emotional Distur-
bance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 504 (1922).
157. See Sam Finley, Inc. v. Russell, 75 Ga. App. 112, 117, 42 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1947).
158. See Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 476, 374
P.2d 549, 553-54 (1962).
159. See, e.g., Greer v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) % 9521, at 23,296 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1982) (woman who did
not suffer any permanent injury, disability, or extreme pain and suffering awarded $2,500
for drinking from a bottle that contained dirt and glass slivers); Paul v. Hardware Mut.
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have recognized that ingestion of a toxic substance may be sufficient si-
multaneous impact or injury to sustain an award for fear of disease. They
have taken different approaches, however, in arriving at this conclusion.
An example of one approach is the toxic tort case of Ayers v. Township
of Jackson."6 In Ayers, residents of the New Jersey township sued for
cancerphobia arising from their enhanced risk of cancer due to ingestion
of toxic waste that leaked from the municipal landfill into their well
water. 6 ' Plaintiffs alleged that the ingestion caused a negligible change
to their bodies, which constituted sufficient impact or injury to sustain
their cause of action.162 The New Jersey court, citing an early impact
case in which a woman was allowed to sue when some debris hit her in
the neck and dust got into her eyes, 63 denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment because further findings as to the nature of the im-
pact were necessary.' 64 The court sought to determine whether the in-
gestion of the chemicals caused a change in plaintiffs' bodies, even
though currently negligible, and thereby caused plaintiffs physical in-
jury. 165 The question is presumably one of degree, because all chemicals
that enter the body cause some change. Presumably, a purely transitory
change with no discernible effects would not be sufficient, or the question
would not have been put to the jury. A slight change with potential for
future harm may be.'6 6 A jury ultimately found in favor of Ayers plain-
tiffs.167 If such a change is adequate, most toxic tort claimants can show
Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 690, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (plaintiffs consumption of contami-
nated beverage establishes prima facie case against manufacturer); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. White, 545 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (plaintiffs awarded S2500 for
mental anguish despite lack of medical proof that illness resulted from consumption of
soft drink containing a mouse).
160. 189 NJ. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184 (Law Div. 1983).
161. Id. at 564-65, 461 A.2d at 186.
162. Id. at 671, 461 A.2d at 189. Plaintiffs had two alternative theories for their
cancerphobia claim: that it was a cognizable negligence claim without the need to show
physical injury from the emotional distress, or that the ingestion was sufficient injury or
impact to sustain the claim. On the former claim, the court found that plaintiffs would
have to show physical injury from their emotional distress because otherwise the task of
controlling such contamination cases "would become prodigious." Id., 461 A.2d at 189.
163. Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 73 NJ.L. 405, 406, 63 A. 860, 860 (1906).
164. Ayers, 189 NJ. Super. at 572, 461 A.2d at 189. The court found that unlike the
case of the plaintiff in Porter, there was no "immediate and direct physical impact and
injury" to these plaintiffs. Therefore, it remanded the case to the trial court to decide
"whether there was an 'impact' sufficient to support a claim of emotional distress." Id. at
571, 461 A.2d at 189.
165. Id. at 571, 461 A.2d at 189.
166. See Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Admittedly, the
'impact' of a tubercle bacillus does not entail the palpable physical shock of a highway
collision. But ... the effects of a concededly minute tubercle bacillus are potentially no
less lethal. . . ." Tests had shown that the prisoners had the bacilli, but they did not get
the disease.).
167. The jury awardedAyers plaintiffs $18 million: $8 million for monitoring and SIO
million to compensate for emotional distress, decline in the quality of life and the expense
of hooking up to an uncontaminated water supply. Nat'l LJ., Jan. 9, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sufficient injury to support an emotional distress claim. 168
Not all courts, however, have taken such a liberal approach to impact.
The court in Payton v. Abbott Labs169 stated that impact can be a suffi-
cient basis for a fear of disease case as long as the emotional distress is a
reasonably foreseeable outcome of the impact. 7 ' It is foreseeable that
the ingestion of a toxic subtsance would reasonably cause an individual
to fear the possible adverse consequences. Nevertheless, the court did
not discuss whether plaintiffs-women who were exposed to the drug
diethystilbestrol (DES) in utero-had experienced impact.1 71 This may
be because the court was answering a certified question that assumed that
plaintiffs had suffered no physical harm. 72 The Massachusetts court
merely held that plaintiffs must suffer physical harm which "must either
cause or be caused by the emotional distress alleged," and that the harm
"must be manifested by objective symptomatology and substantiated by
expert medical testimony."' 173
In a later DES case, the United States District Court for the District of
168. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d
431 (Tenn. 1982), allowed recovery to a family for their mental anguish caused by learn-
ing that they had ingested chlordane, a possible carcinogen, due to the defendant's negli-
gence. See id. at 432. The family suffered no physical injury from the ingestion and the
mental anxiety did not produce physical symptoms. Nevertheless, the court, citing dele-
terious-food-and-beverage decisions as well as early telegraph and mishandling-of-body
cases, allowed recovery. See id. at 433-34. Ingestion of the toxic substance was found to
be sufficient physical injury to support the award for their anxiety about the possible
harmful effects to their health. See id.
The court cited with approval the lower court's jury instructions, which stated:
"If [the plaintiffs] ingested any amount of the toxic substance, it is the judgment
of the Court that that is at least a technical physical injury. But it is not an
injury from which they are entitled to substantial damages under the facts of
this case, that is from a physical injury. But, where there is any physical injury
at all-any attendant mental pain and suffering is compensable."
Id. at 434. (alteration in original).
A similar ruling was made by the Third Circuit in a nontoxic tort context. The court
found that prisoners who allegedly were negligently exposed to the active tuberculosis of
a fellow prisoner had sustained impact when the tubercle bacilli infected their bodies, and
that they could therefore sue for their anxiety about getting the disease. See Plummer v.
United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978).
169. 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
170. Id. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 180-81.
171. The court does conclude that if plaintiffs can prove that they were injured by
defendant, they can sue even though the injury occurred in utero. Id., 437 N.E.2d at 180-
81. Thus they implicitly conclude that whatever impact occurred, it occurred in utero.
172. Id. at 544, 437 N.E.2d at 174.
173. Id. at 552, 437 N.E.2d at 181. Causing plaintiffs to ingest the drug diethylstilbes-
trol (DES) was sufficient impact or touching to support a claim for emotional distress
resulting from battery in Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. I11.
1978). Mink plaintiffs were given DES allegedly without their knowledge or consent, as
part of a medical experiment conducted by the University of Chicago and Eli Lilly & Co.
Id. at 716. In a footnote the court indicated that if the emotional distress claims had been
based on negligence rather than battery, they would have been dismissed because no
physical damage was alleged. See id. at 716 n.2. Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
reproductive tract and other abnormalitites, id. at 715, but the court found the allegation
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Rhode Island implied that ingestion was not sufficient impact and that
therefore a physical manifestation of the emotional harm was necessary.
The plaintiffs in Plummer v. Abbott Laboratories,"' who allegedly suf-
fered emotional distress due to their increased risk of developing can-
cer, 1" based their claims on negligent infliction but did not allege
physical manifestations of the distress. 76 The court found that, in the
interest of control and screening of false claims, Rhode Island would not
allow recovery when "both impact and physical manifestations of the
asserted emotional harm are absent." '177 The court, without discussing it,
assumed that ingestion was not sufficient impact.'78 This focus on physi-
cal injury rather than on impact or emotional harm is likely to continue
as courts become increasingly aware of the need to control toxic tort
insufficient because there was no indication that any of the plaintiffs had actually suffered
any of the abnormalities, see id. at 719.
At the time of Mink, Illinois had not yet rejected the requirement of physical impact to
sustain an action for negligent infliction, see Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill.
App. 3d 439, 440-43, 428 N.E.2d 596, 597-99 (1981) (rejecting the impact rule), therefore
physical damage need not have been determinative. However, although not discussing
the point, the court did imply that ingestion alone was not sufficient under the Mink
facts. See id. Apparently the fact that the fear of disease claim was parasitic to the inten-
tional tort of battery, as opposed to standing on its own as a negligence claim, was deter-
minative.
Of course, the great majority of toxic tort plaintiffs will not be able to rely on such an
intentional tort theory. Most people exposed to products that cause delayed-manifesta-
tion injuries know that they are being exposed to the product; they are just unaware of its
harmful properties. Such people could posit a cause of action based on lack of informed
consent and rely on the medical malpractice cases for precedent. The Mink court, how-
ever, found such cases to be negligence cases; battery was only for those cases in which
there was no consent. Id. at 716-17. Other courts are likely to reach this same conclu-
sion. See, eg., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 233, 502 P.2d 1, 3, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508
(1972); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572, 461 A.2d 184, 189 (Law
Div. 1983); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 570, 207 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1973).
Property owners who are exposed to toxic substances, with or without their knowl-
edge, are increasingly relying on the torts of trespass or nuisance, as well as negligence.
See supra note 114. Plaintiffs in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 NJ. Super. 561, 461
A.2d 184 (Law Div. 1983), for example, who unknowingly ingested contaminated water,
based their claims on trespass and nuisance as well as battery, strict liability and negli-
gence. The court discussed plaintiffs' fear of disease claims only in terms of negligence.
However, the court also found that there was no merit in plaintffs' claims of inverse
condemnation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), or a violation of their due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment. 189 N.J. Super. at 660-62, 461 A.2d at 191-92.
174. 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983).
175. Id. at 927.
176. Id. at 921.
177. Id. at 927.
178. See id. In Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 552, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180
(1982), a DES case brought by daughters who may develop cancer, the court recognized
that impact would be a sufficient basis for suit because it is a sufficient indicator of fore-
seeability. It apparently assumed, without discussion, that the daughters had suffered no
impact even though the drug had obviously come in contact with their bodies while they
were in utero. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. A large number of daugh-
ters could also show some physical damage by showing that they had developed adenosis.
See infra note 267.
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cases. It will result in the denial of recovery to many toxic tort claimants
because they typically do not allege or show physical injury.
2. Physical Manifestation in Toxic Tort Cases
The great majority of states, as they abandoned impact as a requisite
for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, required that physi-
cal harm result from the emotional distress. 179 It was assumed that if the
distress were sufficient to cause physical injuries, the suits would not be
frivolous or fraudulent and could be contained.' This screening device
will continue to be a primary focus of courts dealing with toxic tort fear
of disease cases, despite the fact that the emotional distress clearly results
from plaintiff's exposure to a very real harm, and the recognition that
genuine emotional injury can occur without significant physical harm. I8 I
Not all courts will interpret the manifestation requirement as a bar to
recovery when the injury is limited to emotional distress. Many courts
have held that even under a manifestation test, bodily contact with a
frightening or noxious substance is sufficient physical injury to sustain an
award for emotional distress that ensues from this contact.18 2 In Laxton
v. Orkin Exterminating Co. "3 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
contact with adulterated water containing chlordane, a possible carcino-
179. See supra note 35. Fewer than ten states follow only the impact rule. Winter,
supra note 50, at 63.
180. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 78-79 (1968); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 520, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978);
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 464, 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (1965); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 403, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d
104, 106 (Iowa 1981); Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 509, 159 P. 401, 401-02 (1916);
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 436-37 (Me. 1982); Green v. T.
A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909); Daley v. LaCroix, 384
Mich. 4, 12-13, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (1970); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn.
400, 403-04, 165 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324,
338-39 (Miss. 1975); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983); Kelly v.
Lowney & Williams, Inc., 113 Mont. 385, 388, 126 P.2d 486, 488 (1942); Fournell v.
Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 687, 305 N.W.2d 605, 606-07 (1981); Corso v.
Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 654-56, 406 A.2d 300, 305-06 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88,
96, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (1980); Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d 582, 583, 251 N.Y.S.2d
839, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D.
1972); Melton v. Allen, 282 Or. 731, 736, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1978); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 160, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (1979); Mack v. South Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 332-33,
29 S.E. 905, 908-10 (1897); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 378, 379, 167 N.W. 398, 399
(1918); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 184, 397 S.W.2d 409, 410-11 (1965); Lan-
dreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 410, 234 A.2d 656, 659-60 (1967); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 31-32,
197 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1973); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 433, 553 P.2d 1096,
1101-02 (1976); Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 346, 36 S.E.2d
475, 479 (1945); Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 227, 177 N.W.2d 83, 86 (1970).
181. See supra notes 160-67, infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978); Laxton v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).
183. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
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gen, is sufficient physical manifestation to meet the rule.' The court
allowed recovery despite the facts that the family suffered no physical
injury from ingestion, the mental anxiety did not produce symptoms, and
it was not severe enough to require medical treatment.18 5 At most, Mrs.
Laxton was "very worried" and would "call her husband at work, and
cry and express concern about the future health of her children."' 86
The court found persuasive the fact that the plaintiffs had reasonably
obtained medical services because of their exposure."8" This medical
treatment was sufficiently close to physical injury to fit the case within
the requirement.' 88 Plaintiffs, however, did not seek treatment for any
physical manifestation of their mental anxiety or for the mental anxiety
itself.'89 When the children in the family exhibited a general malaise,
they were taken to their doctor, who, knowing of their ingestion of con-
taminated water, took blood tests of the family. 90 The blood tests
showed that the family had a mild sub-acute reaction to a viral infection,
and that there were no chlordane-related abnormalities.'' The family
was advised that they needed no more tests because they had changed
water sources and the chlordane was not presently a problem.'9 2
As in the earlier fear of disease cases, the court only allowed the award
after finding the family's fears and their seeking of medical tests to be
reasonable.' 93 In addition, as in those earlier cases, 194 the time for which
damages could be recovered was severely limited: Plaintiffs could re-
cover only for the time between the discovery that the ingestion could be
harmful and the time blood tests showed that the chlordane had not
caused abnormalities-a period of one month."95 It was during this pe-
riod that there was sound reason to be concerned. 96
The result of other courts' focusing on this "medically reasonable"
precedent from earlier fear of disease cases would be to enable virtually
all fearful toxic tort plaintiffs to bring suit. Presumably anyone who dis-
covers that he or she has been exposed to a toxic product and who is
sufficiently worried to suffer mental distress will seek a medical examina-
tion to determine if he or she shows any symptoms of the feared disease.
Because there has been exposure to a toxic substance, seeking such exam-
184. Id. at 434.
185. Id. at 433, 435.
186. Id. at 433.
187. Id. at 434; cf. Hassing v. Wortman, 214 Neb. 154, 165, 333 N.W.2d 765, 771"
(1983) (plaintiff denied recovery when emotional distress did not cause her to seek contin-
uous medical treatment).
188. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).




193. Id. at 434. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
195. See 639 S.W.2d at 432-34.
196. See id. at 434.
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inations is reasonable and therefore, under the Laxton precedent, satisfies
the physical manifestation requirement.
In the Payton case, however, the plaintiffs' allegation that they had
sought periodic medical exams for cancer on the advice of their physi-
cians was not a sufficient demonstration of manifestation for the Massa-
chusetts court.197 After reviewing the history of emotional distress suits,
the court chose to require objective symptomatology of the physical man-
ifestation and corroboration by expert medical testimony. 198 The fact
that the fears themselves are reasonable and are based on objective evi-
dence that can be substantiated by expert medical testimony is not
enough. The court concluded that unless anxiety produces physical
manifestations or flows from a physical injury, it is not sufficiently seri-
ous to merit recovery or to ensure the genuineness of the emotional dis-
tress claim.199
Because DES produces adenosis in up to ninety percent of women ex-
posed in utero to the drug, most of the DES plaintiffs would be able to
meet the Payton physical injury requirement. 2"° Such a showing, how-
ever, bears no necessary relationship to the genuineness of plaintiff's fears
about developing DES-related cancer, and would leave some of the DES
daughters with no remedy. By following prior fear of disease decisions
and requiring expert medical substantiation that the fears are based on
sound probability, a more equitable result would have been achieved.20
The court, however, opted for the screening devices of other emotional
distress cases, choosing control over the comprehensiveness exhibited by
the Ayers and Laxton decisions.
Strict adherence to the manifestation screening device will result in the
denial of meritorious claims. From the standpoint of avoiding such
harsh consequences, the Laxton approach is preferable. Fear of frivolous
claims, however, appears to be the dominant consideration in these cases,
and perhaps rightly so.
3. Judicial Concern with Frivolous Claims
The main difference between traditional impact cases and many toxic
tort claims is the time lag between impact and emotional injury. In the
197. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 545, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173-74 (1982).
Although only .14 to 1.4 per 1,000 DES daughters develop adenocarcinoma, a fast-
spreading cancer, 30-90% of DES daughters develop adenosis, precancerous vaginal and
cervical growths that can spread to other areas. The latter condition requires close moni-
toring and treatment. Close monitoring is also required if adenocarcinoma is to be diag-
nosed at an early enough stage to make treatment effective. See Physician's Desk
Reference 1126, 1127 (38th ed. 1984). But see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963, 965 n.7 (1978) (close monitoring may not
reveal DES exposure) [hereinafter cited as Enterprise Liability].
198. Payton, 386 Mass. at 552, 437 N.E.2d at 181.
199. See id. at 551, 437 N.E.2d at 180.
200. See supra note 166.
201. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978); Laxton v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).
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former, mental distress occurs almost instantly; in the latter, it often oc-
curs more than a decade later.2 '2 This may also account for the differ-
ence in result between Ayers and Laxton, and decisions such as Payton
and Plummer. The crucial difference may be one of degree rather than
one of simultaneousness per se. Although there may be no logical or
causative reason for the phenomenon, the long standing concern with
control and containment of frivolous claims seems to get stronger as the
time period gets longer. In Laxton and Ayers, for example, plaintiffs
drank water containing toxic substances for a period of time before dis-
covering the harmful properties in the water. In both cases, however, the
last ingestion was close in time to discovery of the potential harm.203
After discovery, plaintiffs suffered emotional distress from concerns
about developing diseases from these toxic substances. The Laxton court
allowed suit without discussing the time issue, noting only that the dis-
tress followed soon after plaintiffs learned of the water's harmful proper-
ties, and that the distress was very short-lived. 2' The Ayers court,
however, specifically stated that the issue was foreseeability, not immedi-
acy. Plaintiffs need not show that their fright resulted from fear of imme-
diate personal injury, as long as defendants could foresee that allowing
carcinogens to get into the drinking water would cause fear of cancer.205
If the harm is foreseeable and the plaintiff's fears are reasonable and suffi-
ciently severe, suit can be brought.20 6
The fact that the fear and ingestion were not simultaneous, however,
seems to have caused the Plummer court to state that there was not suffi-
202. DES, for example, does not produce physical symptoms until the daughter of the
mother who took the drug is at least 10-12 years old. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980). Asbestos injuries can take up to 20 years to become manifest. Wall St. J.,
June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
203. The Laxtons used water that was contaminated with chlordane and heptachlor
for approximately eight months before learning of its toxic nature. A foul odor and bad
taste in the water caused them to have it tested. They discontinued use at the time of
testing, and soon thereafter the test results indicated the water's contamination. Laxton
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 432-33 (Tenn. 1982). In Ayers, township
residents used contaminated water from 1972 to 1978. In November 1978 the State of
New Jersey advised them to stop drinking their well water. Ayers v. Township of Jack-
son, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 565-66, 461 A.2d 184, 186 (Law Div. 1983).
204. See 639 S.W.2d at 434.
205. 189 N.J. Super. at 570, 461 A.2d at 188-89; cf. Plummer v. United States, 580
F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978) (negligently failing to diagnose a prisoner's tuberculosis cre-
ated foreseeable risk that plaintiff would be potential victim).
206. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 570, 461 A.2d at 188-89. The court found that if the
claim rested only on emotional injury, plaintiffs would have to show both physical injury
from the emotional distress and forseeability. Id. at 570, 461 A.2d at 189. For a claim
based on impact and resultant emotional injury, the court required the following ques-
tions to be answered:
(1) Was it reasonably foreseeable on the part of the township that their negli-
gence in permitting contaminants to escape would cause the type of fear exper-
ienced by plaintiffs?
(2) What is the nature of the impact to plaintiffs' body caused by the ingestion
of these contaminants?
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cient impact or physical manifestation to sustain a claim for the mothers'
fears of developing cancer.20 7 The court discussed the time lag in the
context of the mothers' claims for damages based on fears that their
daughters would develop cancer, a third-party emotional distress claim
for which simultaneity has traditionally been crucial. 20 8 The court con-
cluded, however, that "prudential jurisprudence" would bar the mothers'
recovery for worrying about potential medical problems of their own or
their daughters, because "the trauma of the moment is dissipated by
space and time to such an extent that tort law should not permit recov-
ery."'2 9 Thus, the court incorporated simultaneity into the impact and
manifestation requirements to narrow recovery in toxic tort fear of dis-
ease cases.
210
In Plummer, the time lag between ingestion and the development of
the fears was years, not days.211 If it is foreseeable that causing someone
to ingest a carcinogen will cause emotional distress due to fears of devel-
(3) Are the emotional injuries complained of by plaintiffs sufficiently severe to
be compensable under present case law?...
Additionally, it will initially be for the court to determine whether the re-
sponse and resulting mental illness was idiosyncratic and not foreseeable, or of a
type readily expected from defendant's conduct.
Id. at 571-72, 461 A.2d at 189.
207. See Plummer v. Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 924-25 (D.R.I. 1983).
208. See Winter, supra note 50, at 64; see, e.g., Beanland v. Chicago, Rock I. & Pac.
R.R., 480 F.2d 109, 113-14 (8th Cir. 1973); Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., [1983-84 Transfer
Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9945, at 25,369 (D.S.D. Oct. 14, 1983); Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80-81 (1968) (en banc);
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 167, 326 A.2d 129, 131 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1973); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170-71, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20
(1970); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Super-
markets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
568, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978); Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 586-87
(Mont. 1983); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 657, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979); Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 99, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 170-71, 404
A.2d 672, 685 (1970); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978);
Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 29, 197 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1973).
209. Plummer, 568 F. Supp. at 925.
210. In the case at bar, there was no episodic single incident to be witnessed; there
was merely the insidious development-or, as to many of the targeted plaintiffs,
only the threatened development-of a disease process .... Whereas [other
cases have] dealt with on-the-spot observation of a finite moment in time, the
instant claims deal with psychic trauma arising from entropic events of indefi-
nite duration and infinite expanse. The policy considerations-social, economic
and administrative-are largely dissimilar. If the targeted plaintiffs are permit-
ted to pursue their causes of action, then the lid is lifted from Pandora's jar and
there will be few-if any-cases in which a relative (or a sweetheart or close
friend, for that matter) will be barred from prosecuting a claim for emotional
distress arising out of injuries to another.
Id. at 924-25 (footnote omitted).
211. The specific time lag is not set out in Plummer, but the manufacture of DES for
antimiscarriage purposes was discontinued in 1971 and suit was brought in 1980. See
Berns & Lykos, Sindell v. Abbott Labs-The Heir of the Citadel, 15 Forum 1031, 1031
(1980). Plaintiffs, therefore, must have ingested it several years before learning of its
harmful properties and suing.
FEAR OF DISEASE
oping cancer, it should be irrelevant that the fear develops several years
after ingestion, as long as the fear develops close in time to the gaining of
knowledge of the carcinogenic properties.212 In adulterated food cases,
for example, the emotional distress arises from discovering that there was
something noxious in the food ingested.3' In toxic substance cases the
same is true: Emotional distress arises from discovery that the substance
that has entered the body is potentially disease-causing. If the causal con-
nection is clear, the fact that the emotional distress does not coincide
with impact should not bar suit. Indeed, the early mishandling-of-body
cases, in which recovery for emotional distress was first allowed, did not
necessarily require congruence between the negligent act of mishandling
and the emotional distress,214 which often arose later when knowledge of
the mishandling was obtained. More recently the California Supreme
Court, in its landmark Molien decision, found that simultaneity should
not be determinative.2" 5 The plaintiff husband recovered in that case
even though he was emotionally injured only when he learned of the
negligent diagnosis given to his wife, not when the actual diagnosis was
given.21 6 Some courts may, however, be uncomfortable with a long time
lag even though the knowledge just as clearly causes the emotional dis-
tress, and significant time lags may provide a convenient, though not nec-
essarily logical, way to limit fear of disease cases.
212. In Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214
(1983), the time lag between defendants' negligence and plaintiffs' injuries in part led to a
denial of recovery. See id. at 279, 662 P.2d at 1222. Plaintiffs' daughter was critically
injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 268, 662 P.2d at 1216. They were told that she
was dead when in fact she was being treated at a different hospital. Id. at 269-70, 662
P.2d at 1217. Plaintiffs, who suffered from substantial health problems prior to the acci-
dent, see id. at 271, 662 P.2d at 1218, filed suit for the emotional harm and additional
physical problems caused by the misinformation, id. at 273, 662 P.2d at 1219. The court
found that plaintiffs' illnesses developed six weeks to two years after the accident, id. at
277, 662 P.2d at 1221; there was, therefore, no evidence that the hospital's negligence was
the direct, proximate, or even major cause of their illnesses, id. at 279, 662 P.2d at 1222.
The court found that the stress caused by caring for the injured child was probably the
cause of plaintiffs' problems. See id., 662 P.2d at 1222.
213. See, e.g., Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1980)
(emotional distress from sight of cockroach in can of soup); Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 712, 135 P.2d 676, 680 (1943) (mental shock from seeing
cleaning brush in bottle).
214. See, e.g., Brown Funeral Home & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 662, 148 So.
154, 155 (1933) (faulty embalming of body); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga.
62, 67, 51 S.E. 24, 28 (1905) (negligent shipping of body); Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind.
536, 545, 25 N.E. 822, 825 (1890) (misdelivery of body).
215. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 922-23, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1980). See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
216. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835; accord Clark v.
Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983) (sustaining plaintiff's award for physical and emo-
tional distress due to application to his skin of benzidine, which he later learned was a
carcinogen); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs were
exposed to tubercle bacilli several months before learning of the nature of their exposure).
Some 6ourts have recently found that simultaneity is not crucial in third party suits, in
which it has traditionally been a key element. See infra note 247.
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An additional factor in most toxic tort cases which did not exist in
Laxton and most early fear of disease cases is the duration of the fears. 21
7
When the victims have been exposed to substances like asbestos, DES
and radiation, they cannot remove themselves from the hazard and
thereby stop the risk as the Laxtons were able to do. The potentially
harmful substance remains in the body waiting "[1]ike the sword of Dam-
ocles'21 to strike at some indeterminate future date. 19 Thus, the fear of
disease is likely to last much longer than has been true in most fear of
disease cases. Although this is likely to lead to higher jury awards, it
does not change the substantive merits of the case. It may, however,
make courts more reluctant to allow suits that do not have this inherent
limitation. Courts faced with such situations may follow the lead of
Plummer and Payton and ensure that the controls from emotional dis-
tress suits remain in toxic tort fear of disease cases.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Toxic Tort Cases
The requirement of physical manifestation has generally been aban-
doned in cases in which the emotional distress has been recklessly or
intentionally inflicted.120 Thus, toxic tort plaintiffs who do not suffer
physical injuries may be able to proceed under the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.22 ' Intentional infliction is particularly
amenable to toxic tort suits because virtually all such suits allege that
defendants knew of the harmful properties of their products but con-
cealed or failed to act on this knowledge for a substantial period of
time.222
There is increasing evidence of manufacturers distorting, hiding or ig-
noring information concerning the toxic effects of their products.
223
217. Plaintiffs' fears in Plummer v. United States were found to be of limited duration
because they had "immunity to outside infection." 580 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1978).
218. Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 331, 74 S.E. 885, 886
(1912).
219. Asbestos fibers, which can enter the body from a variety of sources, remain in the
body and can cause several diseases that may not become manifest until more than 20 to
40 years after exposure. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
220. See, e.g., Sypert v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 546, 548 (1983); Hubbard v. UPI,
330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983).
221. This issue was raised in Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 n.5.
(N.D. Ill. 1978), but the court did not deal with it. Similarly, the court did not deal with
a claim based on misrepresentation.
222. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925-
26, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 469, 612 P.2d 948, 950, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 860 (1980).
223. Such allegations are routinely made in asbestos cases. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure to warn of hazards of
asbestos exposure); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 9408, at 22,756 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1982) (plaintiff submitted
sufficient evidence to show that defendant knew of the connection between asbestos and
cancer but failed to warn of the dangers); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., [1982-83
Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 9424, at 22,826 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1982)
[Vol. 53
FEAR OF DISEASE
Such evidence is likely to meet the intentional infliction requirement that
defendant's actions be outrageous or reckless. 4 From the inception of
this tort, businesses have been held to a higher standard than have indi-
viduals.225 Recent outrageous business examples include the high-pres-
sure tactics of collection agencies" 6 and employer treatment of
employees." 7 The intentional or reckless endangering of the public by
manufacturers fits easily into the category of the outrageous, especially in
these times of consumerism and expapding liability for manufacturers. "2 8
(asbestos manufacturers failed to provide adequate warnings of foreseeable dangers of
asbestos exposure).
A 1975 deposition of an employee of Cape Asbestos reportedly shows that he warned
Pittsburgh Coming of the asbestos hazard when he helped Pittsburgh Coming buy an
asbestos company in the early 1960's. This deposition is being shared with plaintiffs
lawyers in several asbestos cases. Legal Times, July 4, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
In Barrett v. Whitehead Bros., No. 83-011 1-L (Bankr. D. Va. filed July 29, 1983), it is
alleged that manufacturers and distributors of silica products failed to warn workers of
known hazards and failed to provide them with protective clothing and appliances. See
Nat'l L.L, Aug. 29, 1983, at 8, col. 3. The DES cases contain allegations that defendants
ignored dangers and sold a product that was inefflective for the purpose prescribed. See,
e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603-05, 607 P.2d 924, 931-33, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 139-41, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 544, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173-74 (1982).
Recent allegations that one of the nation's major independent laboratories submitted
fraudulent test results to clients, who then turned them over to the EPA, has called into
question approved use of many chemicals. Agent White, carbayl and paraquat are some
of the products challenged. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 5, col. 1. There are numer-
ous reports of problems at nuclear plants. Commonwealth Edison Co. was denied a li-
cense to operate its Byron nuclear power plant because of failure in quality control. See
Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 2, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
Allegations were recently made that welders at nuclear plant construction sites are
often unqualified, and that test results are routinely falsified to enable them to work. See
Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 6. In addition, an official of the NRC has accused
General Public Utilities Corp., operator of Three Mile Island, of falsifying records con-
cerning leaks in the cooling system before the 1979 accident. Wall St. J., May 25, 1983,
at 6, col. 3 (midwest ed.). A federal grand jury has charged the company with criminal
misconduct. Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1983, at 7, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
224. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965); see, e.g., M.B.M. Co. v.
Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 279-80, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 552, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179-80 (1982).
225. See supra notes 26-27.
226. See, eg., American Fin. & Loan Corp. v. Coots, 105 Ga. App. 849, 853, 125
S.E.2d 689, 691 (1962) (collection at gunpoint); Booty v. American Fin. Corp., 224 So. 2d
512, 513-14 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (letters sent to debtor's employer).
227. See, eg., M.B.M. Co., v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 272, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (1980)
(unfavorable report to unemployment authorities); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371
Mass. 140, 141, 355 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1976) (firing of waitress without cause); Bodewig v.
K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 483, 635 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1981) (employer strip
searched employee in presence of customer).
228. See, eg., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924,
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (market share liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 423-25, 326 N.W.2d 372, 376-77 (1982)
(abrogation of patent danger defense); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213
(Minn. 1982) (same); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 204, 447




The large number of awards of punitive damages in toxic tort product
liability cases lends credence to the fact that such actions are likely to be
considered outrageous.229
If the defendant's actions are outrageous, courts are more likely to
compensate for emotional distress even though there is no physical im-
pact or manifestation.23 ° The outrageousness is considered a sufficient
screening device in itself so that the other screening mechanisms can be
eliminated2 3 1 without raising fears of frivolous claims and a flood of liti-
gation. Individuals who fear a disease to which they have been exposed
by defendant's outrageous or reckless actions should have an easier time
recovering for those fears. If the manufacturer's actions are particularly
irresponsible, that may even be sufficient to allow recovery for fear of
another's safety.
C. Third-Party Recovery in Toxic Tort Cases
Negligence recovery for fears that close relatives will develop a
delayed-manifestation disease from toxic exposure is least likely. In this
situation the time lag problem discussed above232 will probably be deter-
minative. Virtually all courts that allow third-party emotional distress
damages keep recovery within reasonable bounds by relying on the re-
quirements of proximity to and contemporaneous observance of a trau-
matic event.233 These factors are used as predictors of foreseeability, and
229. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9408, at 22,757 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1982) (failure to label product
regarding health hazards); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (D. Colo.
1983) (mobile home manufacturers knew of problems with urea-formaldehyde but did
nothing to correct them); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., [1982-83 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9424, at 22,833-34, 22,836 (D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1982) (asbestos
suppliers held liable for $1.78 billion in punitive and compensatory damages because high
corporate officials knew of the dangers of asbestos but failed to warn workers). But see
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
9583, at 23,567 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 1983) (allegations that defendant marketed drug with-
out adequate testing, committed errors in epidemiological studies, and violated Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act reporting requirements, were deemed by court to be little more
than ad hominem attacks possibly sufficient to prove negligence and strict liability but
legally insufficient to show fraud or support a punitive damage award).
230. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547-48, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176-77
(1982); Magruder, supra note 12, at 1058; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
231. [W]here physical harm is lacking the courts will properly tend to look for
more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental disturbance
claimed is not fictitious; but that if the enormity of the outrage itself carries
conviction that there has in fact been severe and serious mental distress, which
is neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not required.
W. Prosser, supra note 8, § 12, at 60; see, e.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa
1303, 1308, 242 N.W. 25, 28 (1932); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547, 437
N.E.2d 171, 175-76 (1982); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45, 355
N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (1976).
232. See infra Pt. III.A.3.
233. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 80 (1968) (en banc) (plaintiff present when daughter struck and killed by defendant's
automobile); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981) (en banc) (son's obser-
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work so that liability for defendant's negligence to someone else ceases at
some point.234 Plaintiffs in third-party toxic tort suits are unable to point
to any sudden traumatic event to their close relatives from which springs
their emotional distress about those relatives' developing the feared dis-
eases.235 Rather, the distress comes long after defendant's negligent ac-
tion, and generally without proximity or contemporaneous observance.
In virtually all emotional distress cases courts hold that distress from
such after-acquired knowledge is not compensable. 2 6 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear En-
ergy 2 3 7 specifically cited relatives' fears as one reason not to recognize
plaintiffs' emotional impact claims." The Court recognized that rela-
tives of residents in the Three Mile Island area may suffer emotional dis-
tress due to the risks that the start-up of the reactor presents to their
relatives.239 The Court, however, held these fears to be too attenuated to
merit cognizance. 2' Underlying this decision were the fear of fraudulent
or frivolous claims241 and concern for the potential impact on decision-
making resources if such considerations were allowed.242 In a toxic tort
context, the Plummer court denied the third-party claims of plaintiffs,
DES mothers, partially on the grounds of lack of simultaneity.243
Despite the strong third-party emotional distress precedent, the par-
ents in Laxton24 were allowed to recover for their fears about their chil-
dren's health as well as their own.245 The court did not discuss the point,
but it found that there was "sufficient 'injury' to [the] plaintiffs to justify
a recovery for their natural concern and anxiety for the welfare of them-
vance of auto accident involving mother may be sufficient for emotional distress recov-
ery); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 656-59, 406 A.2d 300, 306-08 (1979) (parents who
did not witness accident involving daughter but who observed her immediately thereafter
may have mental distress claim); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 IL. 643, 656-58, 338
A.2d 524, 530-31 (1975) (mother who witnessed death of son in auto accident may re-
cover although she was not in danger).
234. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
235. Plaintiffs would argue that their distress arose immediately upon learning of the
potential dangers to their relatives. Most can allege that some of the delay between the
time of exposure and the gaining of such knowledge was the fault of defendants who
knew of the dangers but did not disclose them because they foresaw that the knowledge
would have adverse effects. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs
would argue that defendants should not be able to hide behind their misleading actions.
See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816-17, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 834-35 (1980) (en banc) (husband allowed to sue for emotional distress caused
by doctor's misdiagnosis of wife's condition).
236. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
237. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
238. See id. at 774.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 778.
242. See id. at 776-78.
243. See 568 F. Supp. at 914-15.
244. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
245. See id. at 434.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
selves and of their infant children."24 6
In addition to the Laxton precedent, there is also some indication that
the simultaneity requirement is beginning to weaken in traditional emo-
tional distress cases, especially when the other two requirements are es-
pecially strong.247 DES mothers, who are the primary third-party
claimants, could present a good case in this regard. Because their chil-
dren were exposed to the DES in utero, the relationship could not be
closer and, as in Haught, they were in some sense the scene of the acci-
dent.24 Although their fear did not arise at the time of ingestion, it did
coincide with their knowledge of the harm, and that fear on the acquisi-
tion of knowledge was foreseeable. So far, however, DES mothers have
failed to recover for fears concerning their daughters.249 Few courts are
soon likely to follow the Laxton or Haught precedents. Courts will most
strongly express their traditional limitation and control concerns through
strict adherence to Dillon. Expansion is likely to come last to this area.
The court in Mink v. University of Chicago,250 although denying such
concerns were sufficient for a negligence action, did leave open the possi-
bility of the mothers recovering for their fears about their daughters
under a battery theory.25I Those toxic tort plaintiffs who can prosecute
their claims under an intentional tort theory may have an easier route to
recovery for their fears about others. Traditionally, courts have been
more lenient regarding recovery in intentional infliction cases in which
defendants' actions are outrageous.25 2 If, as discussed above, defendants'
actions are found to be sufficient to support intentional infliction claims,
fearful parents are more likely to recover.25 3
D. Strict Products Liability
A few plaintiffs have attempted to sue for fears about others as well as
themselves under the theory of strict products liability.254 So far, how-
246. Id. The court also approved the trial court's jury instruction, which stated that
the jury should fairly "'compensate the plaintiffs for mental suffering as a result of rea-
sonable apprehension of harmful effects to their own health and the health of their chil-
dren due to the ingestation of the toxic substances.'" Id.
247. See, e.g., Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 299-302 (5th Cir. 1982) (mother
under anesthesia during negligent delivery of baby); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle,
642 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. App. 1982) (mother who did not perceive son's death in auto
accident may recover because she perceived consequences of accident).
248. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1982).
249. Even if plaintiffs overcome the third-party simultaneity difficulty, they may still
run into problems if they cannot show physical injury. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott
Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 925-27 (D.R.I. 1983); Mink v. University of Chicago,
460 F. Supp. 713, 716 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
250. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
251. See id. at 716 n.2, 718.
252. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
254. See, eg., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. 111. 1978);




ever, such claims have been unsuccessful. As in the negligent infliction
cases, physical injury seems to be a problem. The Mink court denied
strict liability recovery on these grounds.255 The court cited" 6 the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which states that "[o]ne who sells any prod-
uct in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer."25 7 The court found
that because plaintiffs had not alleged physical injury, they did not fit
within this tort.258 Yet it is clear that sellers of adulterated food can be
held strictly liable for injuries flowing to consumers even when the con-
sumers' injuries are purely emotional.25 9 Contact with a frightening or
potentially dangerous product is physically damaging enough to merit
the imposition of strict liability in these cases. A few states have even
allowed recovery for purely emotional distress under a theory of strict
liability in bystander cases. 2" Following these precedents in fear of dis-
ease cases could create the danger of wide recovery for toxic tort claim-
ants because such claims would be parasitic to the claim of strict liability.
E. Containment and Control
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, toxic tort plaintiffs who sue for
fear of disease have met with mixed success. Although precedent clearly
exists for allowing recovery, many courts have opted to focus on require-
ments, such as physical injury, which may bar claimants. In so doing,
these courts hope to put limits on a defendant's liability and screen out
frivolous claims. Limitation and screening have traditionally been con-
cerns of courts recognizing suits for emotional distress. Another tradi-
tional concern, so far largely ignored but which may ultimately prove
conclusive, is the fear of a flood of litigation.26' Modern courts, in ex-
panding recovery under emotional distress, have cited this fear, but they
have generally dismissed it as either unrealistic based on past experience,
or as an insufficient reason to deny meritorious claims.262 Delayed mani-
255. See 460 F. Supp. at 719.
256. See id.
257. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
258. See Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 719.
259. See supra note 159.
260. See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614-15
(1977); Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1982).
261. See, e.g., Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 RI. 186, 190, 66 A. 202, 204-05 (1907)
(flood of litigation limited by requirement of physical injury accompanying emotional
distress); Nolan & Ursin, supra note 37, at 605 (requirements of physical injury and fore-
seeability of risk serve to avoid flood of litigation and unlimited liability).
262. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-29, 616 P.2d 813,
820, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980) (en banc) (floodgate argument irrelevant); Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-61
(1969) (court denied claim but held that proliferation of claims insufficient reason to
deny meritorious action); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 133, 447
N.E.2d 109, 111 (1983) (even if caseload increases, flood of litigation is an unacceptable
reason for denying justice); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 162-63, 404 A.2d 672, 680-81
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festation injury cases, however, represent a clearer threat of inundation
than any other of the previous expansions.
The number of potential suits for work-related asbestos exposure alone
is in the millions.263 One study estimates there are 14.1 million workers
who have had significant exposure to this cancer-causing product since
1940.21 Millions of others have been exposed outside the workplace. 265
(1979) (bystanders may recover for injuries resulting from mental distress despite possible
flood of litigation); Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. Rev. 584, 592
(1961) ("The truth of the matter is that the feared flood tide of litigation has simply not
appeared in states following the majority rule allowing recovery of psychic injuries with-
out impact.").
263. Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
264. The study, by Dr. Irving Selikoff of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory of
the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, estimated that 18.8 million workers had significant
exposure to asbestos since 1940, of which 14.1 million are still living. It was estimated
that 200,000 of these workers will die from asbestos-related cancers by the end of the
century. Nat'l L.J., July 26, 1982, at 14, col. 2. In addition, seven million living work-
ers had less exposure, but were at some risk. Although estimates have been as low as
eight million, see Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 580 n.13 (1983) (citing National
Cancer Institute and National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Estimates of
the Fraction of Cancer Incidence in the United States Attributable to Occupational Fac-
tors 1-2 (draft summary Sept. 11, 1978)), the number of persons developing asbestos re-
lated diseases each year is not expected to level off until the 1990's, id. at 580 n. 16. The
two main asbestos-related diseases are asbestosis, which causes scarring of the lungs, sim-
ilar to emphysema, and mesothelioma, a type of lung cancer. Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981,
at 10, col. 2. Approximately one out of four or five exposed to asbestos will eventually die
of lung cancer, but only one out of fifteen die from mesothelioma, a disease caused only
by asbestos. Id.
To curb the dangers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
promulgated a six month emergency rule that severely restricted asbestos exposure levels.
See OSHA Emergency Temporary Standard, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,086 (1983) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1910). The asbestos industry, however, succeeded in getting a stay of the
standard. See Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 4, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
265. Indirect work-related exposure can also cause asbestos-related diseases. The
worker's family is exposed through contact with the workers clothes and body. See Chi-
cago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1981, § 2, at 9, col. I (citing study released by American Lung
Ass'n); N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at D 11, col. 6 (same). Exposure can come from a
variety of other nonworkplace environments, such as the home and school, in which
asbestos building materials were used. There are estimated to be 14,000 schools with
potential asbestos hazards. Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 18, col. 2. An asbestos inspec-
tion survey reported that up to 3.2 million children may be exposed to dangerous levels of
asbestos in their schools. Wall St. J., July 1, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (midwest ed.). Recent
studies conducted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission showed that exposure to
clothes washers can be dangerous. See 10 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 49 (Jan. 22,
1982). Even walking past an old building that is being razed or renovated creates a risk
of contracting asbestosis. 68 A.B.A. J. 1075 (1982).
A person who continuously inhales an airborne asbestos fiber concentration of one fiber
per milliliter for one year has a lifetime cancer risk of 2,100 to 37,000 per million. 9
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 554 (Aug. 20, 1982) (citing Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n, General Risk Assessment for Asbestos-Consumer Exposure From Products
(draft report)). It has been estimated that 9,000 people will die from asbestos related
cancer each year for the next three decades. The EPA intends to propose a ban or phase-
out of almost all asbestos use. It estimates that 280 million pounds of asbestos are still
used each year and that such use creates an unreasonable public health hazard. Wall St.
J., Oct. 4, 1983, at 3, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
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Another study estimates that one in five Americans runs a risk of devel-
oping cancer. 266 The number of DES-exposed offspring, whose exposure
was not work-related, is also in the millions.267 Asbestos and DES are
but two of the many disease-causing products to which the current popu-
lation has been exposed. Toxic waste, 268 radiation,2 69 formaldehyde, 270
266. Wall St. J. & Dow Jones News Wire, No. 080821-0263, at 1-3 (Aug. 20, 1980)
(available in fies of Fordham Law Review).
267. It is estimated that three million women were exposed to DES in utero. Note,
Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 668,
668 n.7 (1981). More than 1,000 of these women have already filed suit. 67 A.B.A. J.
139, 139-40 (1980). Adenocarcinoma, a fast-spreading cancer that affects approximately
.14 to 1.4 per 1,000 of the daughters whose mothers took DES, is almost unique to DES
ingestion. Adenosis, or pre-cancerous vaginal and cervical growths, affect 30 to 90% of
the DES daughters. Treatment ranges from hysterectomy and removal of the vagina for
adenocarcinoma victims to biopsy, cauterization, and surgery for the sufferers of ade-
nosis. See Physican's Desk Reference, supra note 197, at 1126; Enterprise Liability, supra
note 197, at 964-65. Report of a study by the National Collaborative Dietyhylstibestrol-
adenosis Project published in the Journal of the American Medical Association showed
that DES daughters are twice as likely to develop dysplasia of the cervix than are nonex-
posed women. Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1984, at 43, col. 4 (midwest ed.). In addition, there is
growing evidence that DES is linked with reduced fertility and genital abnormalities in
the sons of women who took the drug. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp.
713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Enterprise Liability, supra note 197, at 964 n.5; Nat'l NOW
Times, Sept. 1982, at 6, col. 4. A recently published study in the New England Journal of
Medicine reported that women who took DES while pregnant run a 50% higher risk of
developing breast cancer than those who were not exposed to the drug. Wall St. J., Dec.
7, 1984, at 43, col. 4.
268. The 419 sites identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as national pri-
orities because of their high level of toxicity from wastes such as dioxin, benzene, chlor-
dane, arsenic, and lead have received wide publicity. See Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 4,
col. 5; id., July 26, 1983, at 1, col. 4 (midwest ed.). There are reported to be 28 cities in
20 states that have sites contaminated by dioxin. Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 47, col. 1.
The discovery of high levels of dioxin in Times Beach, Missouri and the EPA's subse-
quent purchase of the town received widespread national media coverage. See Wall St. J.,
June 17, 1983, at 20, col. 4 (midwest ed.). Exposure to toxic waste, such as that at Love
Canal, is expected to generate the next large round of product liability suits. Want, The
Caseload Monster in the Federal Courts, 69 A.B.A. J. 612, 614 (1983). One suit for S684
million was recently filed by 57 people exposed to the chemical. See Bloomington Her-
ald-Telephone, Nov. 29, 1983, at 3, col. 4. More than 1,300 current and former residents
of Love Canal settled their suit against Hooker Chemical Co. for S20 million. Blooming-
ton-Herald Telephone, Jan. 2, 1985, at 3, col. 5.
269. An estimated 650,000 workers are exposed to low levels of job-related radiation.
The Center for Human Radiobiology studied women who painted watch dials with radia-
tion-emitting paints in the 1920's and 1930's and found some evidence that even low-level
exposure can lead to cancer. Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 1, col. I. This study supports
the findings of a study of Japanese survivors of the 1945 atomic bomb blast, which
showed that risks from low-level radiation were 10 times greater than previously believed.
Id. Claims involving radiation illness have risen since the well publicized Three Mile
Island accident. Claims averaged two or three per year prior to the accident, but now
average 14 or more per year. Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 9, col. 2.
Suits have been filed by servicemen and their families based on exposure to radiation
from testing at such sites as the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls and the Nevada desert. See,
eg., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct.
1272 (1984). Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits members of the
armed forces from suing the government for service-related injuries, see Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950), exposed servicemen have sued the contractors who de-
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and Agent Orange 71 are other toxic products which have received much
veloped the weapons used in the tests, see Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666, 667-68 (1977).
Another source of recent filings has been microwaves. Although microwaves are now
commonly used in the home in ovens, garage door openers and other devices, suits so far
have been based on long term exposure in the workplace. See Yannon v. New York Tel.
Co., 86 A.D.2d 241, 244, 450 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (upholding Worker's Compensation
award to widow of microwave transmission unit repairman), appeal denied, 57 N.Y.2d
726, 440 N.E.2d 797, 454 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1982); Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 24, cols. 1-3
(settlement to radar technician for 13-year exposure at a Nike missile site). Other work-
related suits have involved claims by flight controllers for cataract damage, and cafeteria
workers for skin damage and cataracts. See Nat'l. L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at 25, col. 1.
Microwaves are commonly used outside the home in radar and surveillance equipment,
satellite communication, diathermy machines and many other devices. Id. at 24, col. 1.
They are alleged to cause injuries ranging from genetic damage, id. at 25, col. 1, to can-
cer, impotence, disorientation, deafness, diabetes and cataracts, id. at 24, cols. 1-3. The
relationship between long term exposure and many of these diseases is just becoming
known. It has been predicted that microwave-related suits will become the broadest-
based product liability litigation ever. See id. at 24, col. 1.
270. The Consumer Products Safety Commission's ban on urea-formaldehyde insula-
tion focused national attention on the dangers of formaldehyde. See 10 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 234 (Apr. 9, 1982). The Fifth Circuit, ruling that the Commission
acted without sufficient evidence that the foam is dangerous, overturned the ban several
months later. See Gulf S. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137,
1150 (5th Cir. 1983). The Commission, however, is continuing its investigation into for-
maldehyde, and may take action on other products. Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1983, at 4, col. 2
(midwest ed.). Consumer groups and unions are also putting pressure on other agencies
to regulate or ban the use of formaldehyde. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 5 (mid-
west ed.). Several states and cities have banned the foam insulation. Wall St. J., Nov. 1,
1983, at 7, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
Formaldehyde is used in the workplace in a wide variety of ways. For example, the
AFL-CIO cited formaldehyde as a health hazard to workers in beauty salons and barber
shops where it is used as a sterilizer and an ingredient in some beauty products. Wall St.
J., Feb. 8, 1983, at I, col. 5 (midwest ed.). Use has been especially heavy in the forest
products industry, which uses one-half of the formaldehyde produced,' and in the textile
industry, which uses one-quarter. Wall St. J., May 21, 1982, at 23, col. 1 (midwest ed.).
In all, about 1.4 million people come into contact with formaldehyde solutions in the
workplace. Wall St. J., May 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.). The United Auto Work-
ers, which along with 14 other unions sued OSHA to set stricter exposure standards in
factories, claims that as many as one per cent of workers exposed at current levels may
die of formaldehyde-related cancers. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
There is also wide exposure to formaldehyde outside of the workplace. It is used in
such common products as toothpaste and wash-and-wear clothing. It is also used to
build such products as cabinets, partition walls, decking, paneling, subflooring, millwork,
ceilings, and some plastics and carpeting. See 10 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (DNA) 568
(Aug. 27, 1982). The highest concentrations have been found in mobile homes, which
accounted for 15% of housing starts in 1980. 10 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (DNA) 458
(July 7, 1983). Because people typically spend 80 to 90% of their time indoors, exposure
can be extensive. Id. at 459.
271. The controversy surrounding Agent Orange has caused widespread publicity. It
has recently been revealed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to use the spray for two
and one-half years after receiving a report from the Rand Corporation stating that the
herbicide was poisoning peasants. See Wall St. J., July 6, 1983, at 2, col. 3. Because
veterans cannot sue the military, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950),
they sued the Agent Orange manufacturers, see, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
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publicity, partly due to their wide dissemination. Many other products in
wide use have potentially toxic effects,272 and new relationships are be-
ing discovered monthly.
2 73
Little is known about the long term mental or physical effects of work-
ing or living under the threat of cancer or other disease. Effects of such
stress, however, are beginning to be reported. It was recently discovered
that wood model makers are at much higher risk of developing colon and
rectal cancer than is the general population.27 4 Workers reported higher
use of alcohol since learning of this danger, and a psychologist predicts
more ulcers, drinking and wife abuse will occur as a result of this occupa-
tional disease threat.2 75 The plaintiffs in Ayers alleged that, in addition to
conditions ranging from mild depression to severe psychosis, the families
suffered from stress, outbursts of rage and hostility, loss of sleep, and
1417 (1984). This case was recently settled for $180 million, see Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1984,
at 3. col. 1 (midwest ed.), with Monsanto Company providing almost half the settlement,
see id., May 14, 1984, at 4, col. 2.
Although most Agent Orange litigation involves Vietnam veterans, in a recent case
railroad workers successfully sued the Norfolk & Western Railway for injuries resulting
from a chemical spill involving the same chemical found in Agent Orange. Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, cols. 2, 3. Alleging that the railroad failed to protect them ade-
quately when they cleaned up the spill, 19 workers each received compensatory damages
of $1 million or more. Id. Suits against the manufacturer were settled. Id. The primary
harmful agent in Agent Orange is dioxin, the same chemical that was found at many
toxic waste sites. See supra note 268.
Agent White has also recently come into controversy. It was used in Vietnam until
1971 when the military discontinued its use because, of all defoliants in use, it had the
highest potential for causing long term ecological damage. These suits are being brought
by United States civilians who were exposed to the chemical when the federal govern-
ment, public utilities, timber companies and others applied it to control unwanted vegeta-
tion. Nat'l. L.J., July 26, 1982, at 16, col. 1.
272. Exposure to products such as lead, Benedictin, silica, benzene, vinalchloride, arse-
nic, the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP), beryllium, and polychlorinated biphe-
nyls (PCBs) are generating or are expected to generate large numbers of claims. Legal
Times, June 13, 1983, at 17, col. 4; id. at 30, col. 1. An estimated 500,000 workers, for
example, are annually exposed to Benzene. Newsweek, Sept. 6, 1982, at 57, col. 1.
273. Potential carcinogens generally receive the most publicity. A connection between
cancer and exposure to butadine, a common chemical used to make synthetic rubber, is
causing increased concern to rubber workers. At least three unions are urging OSHA to
adopt a stricter exposure standard. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1983, at I, col. 5. According to
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, asphalt fumes may pose a job-
related cancer risk. Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1983, at I, col. 5 (midwest ed.). The National
Foundation for Cancer Research reported in September 1983 that snuff and chewing to-
bacco contain carcinogens so strong that they could cause malignancies almost immedi-
ately. This is ironic because many substituted these products as a safe alternative to
smoking. Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Sept. 21, 1983, at 3, col. 4. A possible link
between fluorescent lights and skin cancer is causing a medical debate. Wall St. J., Apr.
12, 1983, at 31, col. 3 (midwest ed.). Even chicken kidneys recently became suspect
because they collect high levels of cadmium, a carcinogen. Cadmium, a naturally occur-
ring substance that is used in batteries, television tubes, ink, glass and paper, settles in the
kidneys of mature chickens and turkeys. The Department of Agriculture has proposed a
rule requiring removal of the kidneys before sale. Wall St. J., May 16, 1983, at 25, col. 1
(midwest ed.).
274. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 25, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
275. Id. (citing Geral Self, a psychologist who has counseled the workers).
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other disturbances. 76 Similar conditions have been reported by other
plaintiffs suffering under the threat of developing a disease. 77 In general,
physical or emotional illness grows with the stress of the threat of cancer
or other disease.2 78 Eventually a threat-of-illness etiology may develop
which will make it easier for plaintiffs to recover.
Almost one-half of the states have enacted statutes of repose, which
commonly set a limit from time of purchase, often ten years, after which
suit for physical injuries cannot be brought. 7 9 Similarly, many state
worker compensation statutes impose strict time limitations,2 80 barring
276. Ayers v..Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 568, 461 A.2d 184, 188 (Law
Div. 1983).
277. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 23, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
278. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 25, col. 3 (midwest ed.) (citing Kenneth Axelrod, chief
psychologist at Harper-Grace Hospitals in Detroit).
279. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1984) (ten years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-551 (1982) (twelve years); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1983) (after ten
years rebuttable presumption of no negligence); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577a (West
1984) (ten years); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(2) (West 1982) (twelve years); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 51-1-11(b)(2) (1982) (ten years); Idaho Code § 6-1403(2) (Supp. 1984) (after ten years
rebuttable presumption of no negligence); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums 1984)
(ten years); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (1983) (ten years); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984) (presumption of no negligence five years from
sale or eight years from manufacture); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224 (1979) (ten years); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2 (1983) (twelve years); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981)
(six years); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1983) (ten years from purchase or
eleven years from manufacture); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (1981) (eight years); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1984) (ten years); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (1984) (six
years); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (six years from purchase or ten years from
manufacture); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.72.060(2) (Supp. 1985) (after twelve years re-
buttable presumption of no negligence).
Several courts have held that their states' repose statutes violate the state constitution.
See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1001 (Ala. 1982); Bat-
tilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980); Bolick v. American
Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 595, 284 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1981), modified, 306 N.C.
364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 523-27, 464
A.2d 288, 294-97 (1983); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 9895, at 25,138 (R.I. Jan. 19, 1984). In Bolick v. American
Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982), the North Carolina Supreme Court
backed away from the court of appeals' decision declaring the statute of repose unconsti-
tutional. It modified the appellate court's opinion by holding that the repose statute was
not to be applied to plaintiff's case because such application would have been retroactive.
The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend such
retroactive application. See id. at 370, 293 S.E.2d at 420. Other courts are upholding
state statutes of repose. See, e.g., Philpott v. A.H. Robbins Co., 710 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Oregon); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Ind. 1980)(Indiana); Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 724, 425 N.E.2d 522, 523
(1981).
280. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 25-5-147 (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1318(a)(2) (1976 &
Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-82 (1982); Idaho Code § 72-439 (1973); I11. Ann.
Stat. ch. 48, § 172.36(1)(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); Ind. Code § 22-3-7-9(e) (Burns
Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 85A.12 (West 1984); Mont. Code Ann. § 39-72-403
(1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-58 (1979 & Supp. 1983); S.C. Code Ann. §42-11-70 (Law-
yers Co-op 1976); Utah Code Ann. §35-2-13 (1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1006 (1978).
State statutes of limitations for strict liability and tort actions also restrict plaintiffs'
claims. A 1981 Labor Department study showed that nearly 2 million workers were
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recovery after a relatively short period. Because a large number of vic-
tims will not develop a diagnosable disease until after the running of the
statutory time period, they will not be able to claim compensation for
their injuries.2 81A recent New Jersey decision, which will significantly
add to the number of suits barred, is yet another illustration of the time
problem faced by potential plaintiffs. The case, Coons v. American
Honda Motor Co.,282 does not directly involve toxic substances; it inter-
prets the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute of limitations.283
Although Honda was the company involved in the suit, the case was
primarily argued by an asbestos mining company as amicus curiae.284
The statute, which benefits New Jersey citizens without harming in-state
corporations, tolls the running of the two year statute of limitations in
cases involving suit against a foreign corporation not represented in New
Jersey. The United States Supreme Court, in G.D. Searle Co. v. Cohn,2 5
held that the statute did not violate the equal protection or due process
clauses."8 6 The Court did not resolve a commerce clause challenge to the
statute, however.2 s7 The Coons case resolves this issue.
severely or partially disabled from an occupational disease, yet only 5% of the severely
disabled received workers' compensation. Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (midwest
ed.).
Most states have a short period of limitation for tort and strict liability claims. The
period is usually one or two years, although it can range up to six. McGovern, The
Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions: Pres-
ent and Future, 16 Forum 416, 438-40 (1980). Most states have adopted a discovery rule
that does not begin accrual of the limitations period until discovery of the injury. See,
e.g., Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1980); Frederick v. Calbio
Pharmaceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 53, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292, 295 (1979); Louisville Trust
Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Ky. 1979).
Six states, however, have not adopted a discovery rule, so that accrual begins at the
time of exposure to the product. Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at 30, col. 4. Even in states
that have discovery rules, differing interpretations make the rules more or less restrictive.
Compare Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, Inc., 686 F.2d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 1982)
(cause of action accrues when disease diagnosable and not when actually diagnosed), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983) and Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp., [1982-83 Transfer
Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9419, at 22,803 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1982) (denying
1977 suit of plaintiff who was aware of asbestos-related disease in 1972 but who was not
then a proper party to sue) with Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330, 1334
(D.D.C. 1982) (woman who knew in 1973 that her cervical adenosis was connected to
DES allowed to bring suit in 1980 after learning that injury may have resulted from
defendant's wrongdoing).
281. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. Some products, like DES, injure
on initial exposure but take years for injuries to become manifest. Other products injure
only after prolonged exposure.
282. 94 N.J. 307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983), modified, 96 N.J. 419, 476 A.2d 763 (1984).
283. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22 (West Supp. 1983).
284. The company, Brinco Mining Ltd., is a Canadian asbestos manufacturer. G.D.
Searle & Co. also filed an amicus curiae brief. 94 N.J. at 307, 463 A.2d at 922.
285. 455 U.S. 404 (1982).
286. Id. at 412.
287. The Court in Searle found that the commerce clause issue was "clouded" by an
ambiguity in the state law regarding whether an out-of-state corporation could qualify
under the statute by merely designating an agent for service of process within the state.
Id. at 413-14.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the statute unconstitution-
ally burdened interstate commerce by effectively requiring foreign corpo-
rations that engage solely in interstate commerce to register to do
business in New Jersey in order to gain the statute's two-year protec-
tion. 88 Although the ruling is to be prospectively applied,289 its effect is
that all corporations can now take advantage of the two year bar.290 As-
bestos litigation is especially heavy in New Jersey because of ship build-
ing there, and hundreds of cases will be affected.
Thus, for a large percentage of the millions exposed to toxic sub-
stances, fear of development of the disease provides the only avenue to
recovery.291 An additional spur to sue for fear of disease exists if poten-
tial defendants appear to be in danger of running out of assets before the
claimants develop the feared disease.2 92 These incentives, when com-
288. 94 N.J. at 315, 463 A.2d at 927.
289. 96 N.J. at 435, 476 A.2d at 773. Before the court's original decision was modified
to make the ruling apply prospectively only, Manville Corp. estimated that 60 to 80% of
the cases filed against it in federal court in New Jersey could have been dismissed because
of the ruling, as well as over 50% of the state cases. Legal Times, Aug. 8, 1983, at 7, col.
3.
290. The court reiterated the Supreme Court's statement in Searle that a statute of
limitations is a matter of public policy about the right to litigate, not a fundamental right.
It is, therefore, particularly subject to legislative control. Coons, 94 N.J. at 315, 463 A.2d
at 927.
291. See infra notes 313-18 and accompanying text.
292. As the asbestos litigation has illustrated, this is an increasing threat. Potential
asbestos-related liability was cited by Manville Corporation as its reason for filing for
reorganization. See Manville Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 1122 n.7. Although not in
current financial difficulty, Manville apparently decided that protection under Chapter II
was necessary because a study showed its potential liability from asbestos-related suits
could reach $2 billion, and its net worth was only $1.1 billion. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982,
at 1, col. 6. Some claim, however, that the filing was motivated by the desire to put
pressure on the federal government to shoulder some of the liability arising from expo-
sure to asbestos during World War II shipbuilding activity. Id. At least two other firms,
U.N.R. Industries and Amatex Corporation, have filed for bankruptcy due to asbestos-
related litigation. See Manville Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 1121 n.6.
Other companies have taken measures outside of the Bankruptcy Code because of the
potential liability. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., for example, has, instead of declaring
bankruptcy, moved its employees and manufacturing operations to another company.
Forty-Eight was left to handle the more than 13,000 asbestos-related lawsuits against it.
See 68 A.B.A. J. 1559 (1982). Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. changed its name to Raymark
Corp. and reorganized, in an effort to improve its image and shield itself from some
asbestos-related liabilities. See Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 16, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
Raymark paid out $10.9 million in asbestos-related expenses in 1982, and claimed that
these expenses made the difference between a profitable year and a losing one. Legal
Times, July 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
It has been estimated that the insurance industry may be liable for $38.2 to $90 billion
over the next 35 years due to asbestos-related diseases. See Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at
1, col. 6. At present, the largest class of product liability suits at both the state and
federal level is composed of asbestos-related litigation. Want, supra note 268, at 613.
Similar bankruptcies hit the urea-formaldehyde business. Rapco Foam, Inc., the major
urea-formaldehyde manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy, 10 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
(BNA) 325 (May 21, 1982), and most of the industry is out of business despite the lifting
of the Consumer Products Safety Commission ban, see Wall St. J., May 21, 1982, at 23,
col. I (midwest ed.). See supra note 270.
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bined with the wide publicity about product-caused delayed manifesta-
tion injuries and an increasingly aggressive and organized toxic tort
plaintiffs bar,2 9 3 make fear of inundation of the court system quite
realistic.
In some states, courts are already inundated by asbestos-related dis-
ease suits alone.2 9 4 These courts are especialy likely to view the addition
of hundreds of fear of disease cases as unmanageable. 295 Many courts,
however, may be unpersuaded by this threat. Courts that have expanded
theories2  and developed new ones29  im order to facilitate plaintiffs'
293. The first plaintiffs' group formed to share information on extensive tort litigation
was made up of attorneys handling Dalkon Shield suits. Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at
30, col. 3. An asbestos plaintiff's group was begun in 1976 to reduce mutual discovery
costs and help avoid losing suits. Id. The group has grown to include 150 members. Id.
Plaintiffs groups have also been organized around DES litigation and DBCP suits. Id.
Lawyers involved in silica dust litigation are hoping to organize a nationwide network to
facilitate silica suits. Nat'l. L.J., Aug. 29, 1983, at 8, cols. 3, 4.
A recent addition is the dioxin task force, formed by the plaintiffs' bar to share infor-
mation and coordinate the hundreds of cases based on dioxin exposure. Nat'l L.J., July
4, 1983, at 3, cols. 1, 2. Dioxin, the primary harmful ingredient in Agent Orange, has
caused the contamination of land in several areas of the United States, in addition to
allegedly injuring hundreds of servicemen in Vietnam. See supra notes 268, 271.
294. In Philadelphia, for example, up to a dozen new asbestos cases are being filed for
each one settled. See Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1. In an attempt to handle
the volume, one court has ordered that cases be tried by a judge without a jury, with a
subsequent right to jury trial. Id. Although this procedure has led to more settlements, it
is still doubtful that asbestos cases can be adaquately handled. See id. The Committee
for Equitable Compensation, a coalition of companies, which has been sued for asbestos-
related disease, estimates that 16,000 to 18,000 cases against 260 manufacturers or install-
ers of asbestos have been filed. Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at 17, col. 3.
Other management techniques have included using collateral estoppel to avoid reliti-
gating asbestos issues, see, e.g., Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384, 1387
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (E.D.
Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982), permitting a simultaneous trial of liability
in five asbestos cases before five different juries, Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at 32, cols. 1-
2, organizing discovery in phases, id. at col. 2, consolidating cases at pretrial proceedings,
id., placing a 480 day limit on pre-trial proceedings, Legal Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 1, col.
2, and resolving several cases at one time, id.
Insurers and asbestos producers have proposed an agreement that may relieve some of
the burden. Under the agreement, a claims facility would be established which would try
to settle claims against the companies and defend suits if claimants insist on going to
court. No claims settlement would include punitive damages. Companies would fund
the plan under a formula based on average claims paid in the past and claims still pend-
ing. Legal Times, May 21, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
295. The inundation includes suits involving products other than asbestos. One judge
faced with 119 Dalkon Shield cases is devising ways to expedite them. See Nat'l. L.J.,
July 11, 1983, at 9, col. 1. The American Bar Association, fearing that toxic tort litiga-
tion will overwhelm the court system, has asked that most toxic tort claims be handled
under an administrative forum established by Congress. Want, supra note 268, at 614.
296. Examples of such expansion are the cases that have held that plaintiffs who dis-
cover a product-related injury years after developing a different injury caused by the same
product are not barred from suit. These courts hold that the limitations period begins
running at the time the later injury is discovered. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
525 F. Supp. 671, 674 (D.D.C. 1981); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105
Cal. App. 3d 316, 325-27, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 596-97 (1980). Another example is the
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product liability suits and overcome time-related problems may be reluc-
tant to deny compensation to thousands of victims of toxic torts. They
have overlooked inundation fears in the past and may do so in these
cases. This real threat, however, when coupled with the traditional re-
luctance of most courts to interpret emotional distress claims broadly,
should lead to limited recognition of toxic tort fear of disease claims.
IV. COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS
A. Recovery of Medical Monitoring Costs
Plaintiffs who are unable to recover under the current restrictive re-
quirements may still be able to recover the medical costs incurred in de-
termining whether the feared disease has developed. The court in Ayers v.
Township of Jackson298 so held on the basis of public policy.299 Although
plaintiffs could not recover for the enhanced risk of developing cancer, 300
and possibly not for the fear of developing it,30 1 medical surveillance to
monitor for its development, if necessary, was compensable.
312  Of
course, allowance of such a claim implicitly recognizes that the fears are
reasonable and that there is a clear causal connection between the expo-
sure and the emotional distress. It is a short step from Ayers, in which
costs of medical monitoring were recovered, to Laxton v. Orkin Extermi-
nating Co.,30 3 in which reasonably seeking medical monitoring was suffi-
cient to support the emotional distress claim.3" This middle ground
between recovery and denial may, however, be appealing to courts that
finding by some courts that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until plaintiff
learns that he or she has been injured, the cause of the injury, and that the injury was
wrongfully inflicted by the defendent. See, e.g., Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418,
420-21 (10th Cir. 1977); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574-75 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Kajala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523
F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1975).
297. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enterprise liability); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46 (market share liability), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
298. 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (Law Div. 1983).
299. If plaintiffs are deprived of any necessary diagnostic services in the future
because they have no source of funds available to pay for the testing, the conse-
quences may result in serious, if not fatal illness. Public policy thus supports a
conclusion that if such illness could be prevented by surveillance, then the tort
feasor should bear the costs. Is it reasonable to compel a plaintiff to suffer the
consequence of a serious if not fatal illness before defendent's tortious conduct
is actionable, when reasonable surveillance might prevent the sickness?
Id. at 573, 461 A.2d at 190.
300. Id. at 567, 461 A.2d at 187.
301. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
302. Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 572-73, 461 A.2d at 190. The necessity is to be deter-
mined by the doctor who is to determine whether exposure at various levels to a known
carcinogen requires "annual medical testing in order to properly diagnose the warning
signs of the development of the disease." Id. at 572, 461 A.2d at 190.
303. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
304. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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recognize the real dangers plaintiffs face but that want to hold a tight rein
on emotional distress suits. 30
5
In the recently decided case of Friends for All Children, Ina v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp.30 6 the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed an award
of diagnostic damages. Although the Friends plaintiffs faced possible in-
jury from the explosive depressurization of a crashing plane30 7 rather
than from exposure to a toxic product, the court granted the diagnostic
award on public policy grounds similar to those stated in Ayers.30 The
court determined that it was fairer for defendant to pay for diagnostic
exams than for plaintiff to bear the risk of receiving damages too late to
be of any use.309 In addition, it found that such an award served the two
principal aims of tort law: deterrence of misconduct and just compensa-
tion to the victims of wrongdoing. 310 In so finding, the court rejected
plaintiff's arguments that the jurisdiction did not recognize a cause of
action for diagnostic examination without proof of actual injury, and that
the common law of tort does not encompass an action for being put "at
risk. '311 Finally, the court rejected the argument that undergoing diag-
nostic exams does not constitute injury.31 2
The award of screening costs, and treatment expenses if the disease
develops, comprises an appealing settlement for many plaintiffs. Often
the people who experience heaviest exposure to toxic substances are
305. The court in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984),
prohibited evidence that would show the probability that a worker who was suffering
from asbestosis might develop cancer. See id. at 521-22. Because he did not have cancer,
he was only suing for the increased risk, which was not compensable. Id. at 520. The
court found, however, that such evidence may be admissible to substantiate the workers'
claim for compensation for future medical examinations required to determine if any
cancer had appeared. See id. at 522. It cautioned, however, that such evidence may be
too prejudicial. See id. The court further found that such evidence might also be used to
substantiate a claim for emotional distress if such a claim were allowed. See id. at 522-23.
306. 53 U.S.L.W. 2227 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 1984). Defendants appealed the granting of
partial summary judgment for the cost of comprehensive diagnostic examinations, and a
preliminary injunction ordering it to establish a $450,000 fund to pay the reasonable
expenses of diagnostic examinations. Id. at 2228.
307. Plaintiffs are Vietnamese orphans who were passengers on defendant's aircraft,
which was used in the rescue effort Operation Babylift. Nat'l L.J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 6, col.
3. The plane crashed outside of Saigon in 1975, killing 75 of the 200 children and 59 of
the 75 adults aboard. Id. Plaintiffs are survivors who were adopted by Canadian and
European families. Id. The 59 surviving children adopted by United States families set-
tled their lawsuit for roughly S17.6 million. Id.
308. Friends, 53 U.S.L.W. at 2228.
309. Id. Defendants had objected to the district court awarding interim injunctive re-
lief of $450,000 in a suit in which money damages were sought. Id. The appellate court
found the interim award appropriate because the distict court had already found defend-
ant liable for the damages, and the only issue remaining to be determined was the amount
of damages. Id. In addition, the court found that delay caused by trying to compute the






those who can least afford medical care.3 13 In the town of Triana, Ala-
bama, for example, a dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT) manu-
facturer that closed its plant in 1971 left 837 tons of insecticide at the
bottom of a waterway a few miles upriver from the town.314 Several years
later it was discovered that citizens had high levels of DDT in their bod-
ies, some having the highest levels ever reported in medical history. 31 5
The town had a cancer death rate of almost four times the national aver-
age, yet most residents had not sought medical help because they could
not afford to do so. 316 At least two suits were filed against the manufac-
turer seeking recovery for plaintiffs' mental anguish from knowing that
high levels of DDT existed in their bodies.317 The Triana cases resulted
in a settlement that provided funds for medical screening and treatment
of the feared diseases.318 The Mink case was similarly settled.319 Such a
settlement strikes an appropriate balance between the desire to compen-
sate meritorious claims and the need to avoid a flood of litigation.
B. Future Claims Problems in Bankruptcy and Reorganization
Recognition of fear of disease claims may also help lead to other com-
promise settlements. Future claims problems have plagued attempts at
settlement or management of current delayed manifestation litigation.
Notable examples are the Unarco (UNR) and Manville filings for reor-
ganization, which have affected large numbers of asbestos-related injury
suits.320 UNR's appeal to have a special representative appointed to rep-
313. For example, consumers who experience the highest exposure to formaldehyde
are generally those who live in trailers. See supra note 270.
314. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 23, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
315. Id. One resident had DDT levels twice as.high as any reported in medical litera-
ture, and 11 had levels comparable to the most heavily exposed DDT workers. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. The manufacturer, Olin Corp., reached a settlement in the several Triana cases
that were filed. Suits were brought by the Environmental Protection Agency, Alabama,
and three groups of local residents and fishermen. The settlement provided for payment
of $24 million over 5 years. Of that amount, $5 million was to set up a fund to provide
primary health care and monitoring. Olin also agreed to pay cleanup costs of the area.
Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1983, at 4, col. 2. Olin claims that the 1983 settlement has spawned
suits by approximately 9,000 people who claim injuries from the DDT contamination but
who live further from the plant than the residents of Triana. Legal Times, Aug. 13,
1984, at 1, col. 2. The claims have been consolidated into a suit in the federal district
court in Birmingham, Alabama. Id. The suit, which is currently in discovery, encom-
passes claims for physiological and financial damages as well as for emotional harm. Id.
Claims for the last are made by a large number of minors who have as yet suffered no
illness but who run a higher chance of developing diseases from the exposure. Id.
319. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. The settlement of claims by Three
Mile Island residents provided for a fund for monitoring their health. Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 3,
1983, at 8, col. 3.
320. See Manville Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 1122. Amatex Corporation, another
asbestos manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy after Johns-Manville, but without much pub-
licity. See id. at 1121 n.6. See supra note 292.
Manville is the largest manufacturer of asbestos in the United States, as well as the
most financially solvent. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. Courts have held that
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resent future claimants in its bankruptcy proceeding was rejected by the
district court because it found that future claimants could not be credi-
tors under the Bankruptcy Code.32 Because the claims of asbestos vic-
tims do not arise under state law until these victims know or should
know of their injury, there is no claim until their disease is
diagnosable.3" Without a claim, victims cannot be included in a settle-
ment plan.323 Without the ability to settle future claims problems, com-
panies may be forced into bankruptcy, leaving future claimants with
nothing.324 Representing future claimants in the reorganization plan,
however, raises questions of due process and jury trial rights of these
future litigants.325
The recognition that future disease litigants have a present claim for
emotional distress means that people who have knowledge of their expo-
sure and are concerned could be included in the reorganization plan.326
If included, all present litigants would receive less than if they were the
only claimants, and the emotional distress claimants would receive less
the Manville bankruptcy stay did not preclude maintenance of claims against
codefendents for asbestos-related injuries. See Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715
F.2d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1983); 11 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 251 (Apr. 8, 1983).
321. See In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 746. The UNR court found that it lacked jurisdiction to intervene in future
cases. See id. at 748. It also said that if it granted UNR's plan and took jurisdiction over
future claims, it would open the way for a wave of Chapter 11 filings by other makers of
hazardous products. See id. at 746. The job of dealing with future asbestos claims, it
found, lies with Congress, not the courts. See id. at 748. Although it did not have juris-
diction in the matter, the court also stated that unknown claimants could not be included
in a general class represented by a court-appointed overseer. See id. at 747. It found that
there would be too many conflicting positions in the group, and that the representative
would be unable to determine who to ask what the group wanted. See id.
324. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
325. It would be difficult to get the future litigants certified as a class under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23, which has been incorporated into the Bankruptcy Rules.
See Bankr. R. P. 723, 11 U.S.C. at 238 app. (1982). The class would contain a mix of
wrongful death and personal injury claims, and not all members of the class would be
known. Courts have been reluctant to certify classes with a mixture of claims, and have
preferred individual actions when personal injuries or death are involved. See Manville
Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 1135; see, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337,
1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affid, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 946
(1974); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
Because the class action rule contains an opt-out provision, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2),
anyone who did not receive notice or was not given an opportunity to opt out would not
be included in the class. Thus the possibility remains that unknown future litigants will
have a right to sue, thereby defeating the purpose of a company filing for bankruptcy in
order to have a definite ceiling put on its liability. This possibility could also upset the
settlement of contingent claims necessary for discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982).
326. Such recognition would not entirely solve the problem of future unknown claim-
ants who do not know that they have been exposed. It would considerably reduce the
uncertainty, however, and make the establishment of a fund for unknown litigants more
feasible in a reorganization plan. It would also allow a fairer allocation of resources in a
discharge plan.
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than if they sued later when they developed the feared disease. All are
better protected, however, by giving a reduced amount to each.
An additional advantage of recognizing such claims is that it would be
easier to determine a settled amount for retroactive insurance pur-
poses.327 Retroactive insurance, which is purchased after liabilities have
been incurred, has been used recently in mass disaster situations such as
the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino fire, which killed eighty-five people
and injured hundreds more.328 Manville has suggested the purchase of
such insurance to guarantee payment of claims under its reorganization
plan.32 9 Because the harmful properties of many products were not
known or appreciated during the many years that they were in use, many
companies have inadequate insurance (or no insurance at all) covering
injuries arising from those products. Retroactive insurance is thus a very
attractive alternative. Insurance companies, however, are unwilling to ex-
tend such insurance for an indeterminate amount.330 Recognition of fu-
ture disease claims as current emotional injury claims would facilitate the
determination of a definite figure for insurance purposes.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the claims of toxic tort plaintiffs who are symptomless
but fear development of a delayed-manifestation disease would at best
327. Such coverage, which is relatively new, is also called back-dated insurance.
Under a retroactive insurance plan, the insured pays a very large premium (sometimes as
much as 100 times the usual premium) for coverage. Because payment from this cover-
age will not occur until the policy holder's regular liability policy is exhausted, the in-
surer can reap large amounts through investment. The coverage is attractive to the
insured because the premium is deductible as a business expense. If the insured had to
amass cash reserves against losses, it could not deduct losses until claims were paid many
years later. See Hedges, supra note 7, at 181.
328. The fire, which occurred in November, 1980, led to the filing of more than 3,000
claims. Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1983, at 7, col. 1. The policy obtained by MGM Grand for
$39 million had four layers of retroactive insurance of $170 million. See Bus. Ins., Mar.
21, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Although initially hailed as an innovative solution, the plan is now
the subject of a dispute between MGM and its insurers. See Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at
4, col. 3 (midwest ed.). The insurers are refusing to pay settlements reached by MGM
Grand and injured claimants because the insurers claim that the settlements are so high
that they include punitive damages. Id. Punitive damages are not covered under the
policies. Id. MGM filed suit asking for a declaratory judgment that its settlements are
covered. See Nat'l. L.J., May 23, 1983, at 7, col. 4.
329. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. 6. This is one of several alternatives pro-
posed by Manville. Another is to pay a fixed percentage of future earnings to asbestos
claimants. Id. Under either plan, Manville wants individual amounts of compensation to
be determined by binding arbitration. Id. at col. 5.
330. See id. at col. 6. As a result of the MGM-Grand Hall dispute, insurers are likely
to set tougher conditions on acquiring the insurance, such as strict time limitations on
payouts. Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 11, col. 3 (midwest ed.). One commentator has
urged companies to take advantage of the availability of retroactive insurance while they
can. It is available because of the competition among insurers for premiums and high
interest rates, and may not be readily available if conditions change. Bus. Ins., May 9,
1983, at 28, col. 1.
FEAR OF DISEASE
produce mixed results.33' It would allow suit to thousands of plaintiffs
who might otherwise be denied recovery when they later develop the
feared disease. In addition, it could help lead to solutions to mass disaster
toxic tort problems that some manufacturers are facing. Precedent
clearly exists for the allowance of such suits, but allowing them in the
context of an unlimited time frame would be a dangerous break with that
precedent. It is likely that such recognition would overwhelm the judi-
cial system 332 as well as some defendants already struggling under injury
claims.3
33
Courts have long feared that recognizing and expanding emotional dis-
tress claims would open the proverbial Pandora's box. In the case of
fear of a latent disease, these fears are well grounded. The tort system
simply cannot afford to encompass such pervasive fear. Even if courts
331. See Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks.
The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 618
(1983).
Early warning of the dangers of exposure to toxic substances both to limit exposure
and to encourage monitoring is desired. However, manufacturers and others who pro-
vide these early warnings are also notifying those who have already been exposed that
they face the possibility of developing a harmful disease. The earlier the warning, the
longer the period of emotional distress and possibly the greater the severity. From the
point of view of those who would be held liable, ignorance is bliss. Of course, having
knowledge without providing warnings increases the chance of punitive damage awards,
see supra notes 223, 229 and accompanying text, as well as the total number of those
exposed, so that the possibility of creating or increasing emotional distress claims may
not be determinative. However, it would definitely be a consideration of potential
defendants.
332. In some areas, asbestos cases alone are already threatening to overwhelm the
courts. As a result these courts are instituting changes. See supra notes 294-95. A 1981
settlement of 680 asbestos claims in New Jersey was praised as a way to speed processing
of massive asbestos-related suits. If the cases had gone to trial, it was estimated that they
would have taken 10 years to be resolved. Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981, at 10, cols. 1, 2.
Allowing fear-of-disease suits would not only add to the overcrowding earlier, it could
also add in terms of total number of litigants, because people who never develop the
disease could sue.
333. Although allowing these earlier claims may raise the specter of double liability,
such a result seems unlikely. Some courts have allowed individuals to sue for a later-
developing disease despite the fact that they had earlier developed a different injury from
the same exposure. The decisions have primarily resulted from the court's desire to avoid
barring a meritorious claim on statute of limitations grounds. See, eg., Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115-17 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lundy v. Union Carbide
Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9478, at 23,097 (9th Cir.
Dec. 28, 1982); Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671, 674 (D.D.C.
1981); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 325-27, 164
Cal. Rptr. 591, 596-97 (1980); Anderson v. Sybron Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9507, at 23,218-19 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 1, 1983); cf. Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff with asbesto-
sis can sue later if he develops asbestos-related cancer). However, in none of these suits
did plaintiffs sue for the earlier disease. The courts would probably view compensation
for fear of disease as barring a later suit if the disease develops. See Payton v. Abbott
Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 542 n.8, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 n.8 (1982); cf. Bernstein v. Kapneck,
290 Md. 452, 460, 430 A.2d 602, 607 (1981) (discovery of unanticipated injuries after
release of all claims does not entitle injured to repudiate release and sue for additional
injury).
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generally recognize such claims, plaintiffs still face a very practical but
difficult problem: convincing the jury to compensate them for their fears.
It is difficult to go a week without news of toxic exposure. Virtually ev-
eryone in society is conscious of the fact that the air they breathe, 334
water, food and drugs they ingest,335 land on which they live,336 or prod-
ucts to which they are exposed 337 are potential health hazards. Although
few are exposed to all, few also can escape exposure to any. 338 A member
of our society faces a one in five chance of developing cancer or other
debilitating disease. 339 Probably most are concerned at some level about
the implications of such exposure. Because such risks are inherent in ev-
eryone's lives, it may be difficult to convince a jury that the plaintiff
should be specially compensated for his or her fears. In the DES cases
that have gone to trial, plaintiffs with cancer have collected sizeable
awards,3" but those without have been denied recovery by the jury.34'
334. "Yellow Rain" has been the topic of much recent publicity. See Bloomington
Herald-Telephone, June 21, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (citing a report to Congress by the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment).
335. A recent well-publicized example is the antiarthritis drug Oraflex, marketed by
Eli Lilly & Co. Announced with a high level of publicity, the drug soon was taken off the
market after it was linked to several deaths in the United States and Europe. Nat'l. L.J.,
May 23, 1983, at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1983, at 21, col. 4. Other drugs that have
recently received publicity because of their link to injuries are Lomax, a pain reliever, see
Wall St. J., May 24, 1983, at 35, col. 4, and Bendectin, sold for nausea during pregnancy,
see Nat'l. L.J., June 13, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
One of the most publicized adverse drug reactions was the Guillain-Barre syndrome
developed by some who were innoculated with Swine Flu vaccine. Suits over this devel-
opment are still in the courts. Nat'l. L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 32, col. 3.
336. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has identified 419 priority
sites of high toxic waste, has a list of 16,000 potentially hazardous sites; it is in the pro-
cess of testing the sites, and the list is growing. Wall St. J., July 7, 1983, at 1, col. 4. The
EPA is planning to investigate and clean up as many as 200 Dioxin-contaminated sites.
The process may take 12 years and cost $100 million a year. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1983, at
1, col. 3. See supra note 268.
337. Two products that were widely used but caused illness or death as well as much
publicity are Dalkon Shields and Rely Tampons. The latter had a short-lived but highly
visible product existence, as buyers were warned of the dangers of use and the product
was recalled. Not only have the dangers of the Dalkon Shield been well publicized, but
further publicity has been generated by lawyer's ads seeking clients injured by the prod-
uct. Louisville Courier Journal, Jan. 1, 1982, at B1, col. 5.
338. A United States-Canadian study, for example, suggests that many people may
have traceable levels of dioxin in their bodies even though they have not experienced a
known exposure. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
In Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184 (Law Div. 1983),
the court, in denying recovery for the increased risk of disease, recognized these pervasive
risks: "[T]he court cannot ignore the fact that much of what we do and make part of our
daily diet exposes us to potential, albeit remote, harm." Id. at 566, 461 A.2d at 187. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 266.
340. See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 572, 436 N.E.2d 182, 183, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (1982) ($500,000 awarded); Axler v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 10 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 298, 300 (Pa. Common Pleas Ct. Philadelphia County Mar.
24, 1982) ($1.75 million). Eli Lilly & Co., one of the major DES manufacturers, has
approximately 300 cases pending against it. Of those, only about 60 involve plaintiffs
who have cancer. 69 A.B.A. J. 725 (1983).
341. Three noncancer DES cases have gone to trial. One of these was a case brought
FEAR OF DISEASE
Courts that have liberalized the law of negligent infliction of emotional
distress by not requiring impact have maintained control by requiring
that the plaintiff prove that a reasonable person would have suffered se-
vere emotional distress from the defendant's actions. Courts that have
gone further and substituted seriousness for manifestation likewise re-
quire plaintiff to prove serious mental distress by showing that a "nor-
mally constituted [person] would be unable to adequately cope with the
mental stress engendered by the circumstances. 342 Toxic tort plaintiffs
may discover that courts3 43 and juries view fear of disease to be a normal
condition of everyone's life.
by Gwendolyn Mink, daughter of former congresswoman Patsy Mink, named plaintiff in
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (1978). Gwendolyn Mink, who had
developed a DES-related cervical ridge, and extreme mental suffering and fear that she
might someday develop cancer, sued for SI million. See 69 A.B.A. J. 725 (1983). She
had not seen a psychiatrist about her fears. There was speculation that the lack of such
substantiation regarding her fears was an important factor in her loss. See id.; cf. Hassig
v. Wortman, 214 Neb. 154, 157, 333 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1983) (plaintiff denied recovery
when her emotional distress did not cause her to seek medical treatment or affect her job
performance). But see Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn.
1982) (jury award for plaintiffs' fear of disease upheld).
Plaintiff's chances for recovery without disease development may be enhanced by new
immunological discoveries. Recent advances make it possible to reveal damage to the
immune system in some instances even though no disease is overtly manifest. See Legal
Times, June 13, 1983, at 22, col. 1. Such evidence would mean plaintiffs fears are quite
realistic; alternatively, such damage might be compensable in itself, and support an award
for emotional distress. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
342. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); accord Sloss v.
Industrial Comm'n, 588 P.2d 303, 306 (Ariz. 1978) (highway patrolman not entitled to
workers' compensation unless his stress was unexpected, unusual or extraordinary);
Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (Minn. 1974) (land-
owners must bear those trials "reasonably anticipated by any average member of a vi-
brant and progressive society").
343. See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 569, 461 A.2d 184, 189
(Law Div. 1983). Foreseeability, and requiring that a normal person would suffer severe
emotional distress, are, of course, two sides of the same coin, both serving to limit suits.
The Laxton court, in allowing recovery, found the obtaining of medical services was rea-
sonable and necessary. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn.
1982).
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